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LEMON LAWS: PUTTING THE SQUEEZE ON
AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS
American consumers spend more time shopping for an automobile
than for any other consumer product.! This is true in part because the
automobile industry makes available a large number of foreign and
domestic models and a wide variety of optional equipment, permitting
consumers to order automobiles tailored to their individual needs.2
Manufacturers and dealers, however, severely limit consumers' options
regarding warranty coverage on a new automobile.' All but one manu-
facturer4 offer a standard warranty that restricts a consumer's remedy
1. FTC FINAL REPORT, WARRANTIES RULES CONSUMER BASELINE STUDY 52-54 (1979).
This fact is not surprising because an automobile is the second-largest expenditure for 65% of
American families; for 15% of American families it is the largest purchase. Automobile Warranty
and Repair Act." Hearings on H 1005 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Finance
of the House Comm on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-16 (1979) (state-
ment of Rep. Eckhardt, bill sponsor) [hereinafter cited as Automobile Warranty and Repair Act
Hearings]. In 1981, the average-priced passenger car cost $8,710. MOTOR VEHICLE MFR'S ASS'N
OF THE U.S., INC., MVMA MOTOR VEHICLE FACTS AND FIGURES '82, at 10-11, 39 (1982).
2. See MOTOR VEHICLE MFR'S ASS'N OF THE U.S., INC., supra note 1, at 38.
3. There are only two types of warranty coverage available from automobile manufacturers
selling cars in the United States: American Motors Corporation's (AMC) full warranty,
seeAppendix A, and all other manufacturers' standard limited warranties, see, e.g., Appendix B.
Only AMC's warranty meets the minimum federal standards for full warranty coverage set out in
the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act of 1975, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 2301-2312 (1982). See id § 2304; see also infra note 90 and accompanying text (describing the
Magnuson-Moss Act's full/limited warranty dichotomy). All others offer almost identical limited
warranty coverage. See infra notes 4, 5, 91 & 92 and accompanying text. See generally FTC
SUMMARY REPORT, WARRANTIES RULES WARRANTY CONTENT ANALYSIS 48-50 (1979).
Most warranties provide coverage for 12 months or 12,000 miles, whichever comes first, see,
e.g., Appendix B; some warranties extend coverage for 24 months or 24,000 miles. Foreign car
warranties offer varying combinations of time and mileage limitations. See FTC SUMMARY RE-
PORT, supra at 20. In addition, some warranties extend coverage for up to five years or 50,000
miles on specified parts, usually the components of the power train. See, e.g., Appendix B. See
generally FTC SUMMARY REPORT, supra, at 19-24. All warranties exclude certain parts, such as
tires, from coverage. Id at 49.
4. Although AMC is the only manufacturer to offer a full warranty, see supra note 3, it
holds only about 2% of the market for new car sales. Approximately 98% of all new cars sold in
the U.S., therefore, carry the automobile manufacturer's standard limited warranty. See FTC
SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 3, at 46. Because full warranties have a minimal impact on con-
sumers' automobile warranty problems, this Note gives them only limited consideration. For a
fuller analysis see generally C. REITZ, CONSUMER PROTECTION UNDER THE MAGNUSON-MOSS
WARRANTY ACT 45-57 (1978); Brickey, The Magnuson-Moss Act-An Analysis of the Efficacy of
Federal Warranty Regulation as a Consumer Protection Tool, 18 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 73, 78
(1978).
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for manufacturing defects to repair or replacement of defective parts.5
Many manufacturers allow consumers to purchase a service contract if
they wish to extend the duration of the warranty's coverage.6
For most automobile purchasers, this repair or replace warranty pro-
vides adequate protection against minor defects which commonly occur
in mass produced goods.7 In most cases, the dealer can repair these
defects quickly and completely. Thus, the warranty usually insures
5. The standard automobile warranty traditionally consists of five elements: an express
warranty that none of the covered parts will prove defective during a specified period of time; an
integration clause excluding any other express warranty; a disclaimer of all implied warranties; a
clause providing that repair or replacement of any defective part is the buyer's sole remedy for any
breach of warranty; and a term excluding liability for any consequential losses resulting from a
breach of warranty. See Appendix B. Cf. Eddy, Effects of the Magnuson-Moss Act Upon Con-
sumer Product Warranties, 55 N.C.L. REv. 835, 841 (1977) (identifying four elements of "limited
repair warranty"); Whitford, Law and the Consumer Transaction: A Case Study of the Automobile
Warranty, 1968 Wis. L. REv. 1005, 1013-15 (enumerating risks covered by standard automobile
warranty). The Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) authorizes each of these provisions, See
U.C.C. § 2-313 (creation of express warranties); id §§ 2-316(1), 2-202 (exclusion of express war-
ranties); id § 2-316(2) (exclusion of implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for particu-
lar purpose); id § 2-719(1) (creation of exclusive remedy for breach); id § 2-719(3) (exclusion of
consequential damages); Eddy, supra at 841-42. State and federal legislation has restricted or
occasionally negated a manufacturer's ability to disclaim implied warranties and limit liability for
consequential damages in sales of consumer goods. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1792.4 (Deering
1981); D.C. CODE § 28:2-316.1(2) (Supp. 1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-639(a) (1976); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2-316(5) (Supp. 1982); MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 2-316.1 (1975 & Supp.
1982); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 106, § 2-316A (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1976); Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-2-
719(4) (1972); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, § 2-316(5) (Supp. 1983).
While implied warranties are an important source of consumer rights against a seller, most of
the "lemon laws," which are the subject of this Note, apply only if the manufacturer offers an
express warranty. See Appendix D. This Note, therefore, will focus on consumers' rights under
an express warranty, giving an explanation of implied warranties only insofar as they are relevant
to lemon laws. For a fuller discussion of these warranties, see generally J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-6 to 9-9, 12-5 to 12-7 (2d ed. 1980); Millspaugh & Cof-
finberger, Sellers'Disclaimers ofImplied Warranties: The Legislatures Strike Back, 13 U.C.C. L.J.
160, 168-70 (1980).
6. The consumer may purchase a service contract at the time the car is purchased or shortly
thereafter. The service contract merely extends the duration of the manufacturer's obligation to
repair defects and does not increase responsibility for replacing defective automobiles that the
dealer cannot repair. See Automobile Warranty and Repair Act Hearings, supra note 1, at 498-99
(statement of James G. Vorhes, Vice President, General Motors Corp.).
7. See Goddard v. General Motors Corp., 60 Ohio St. 2d 41, 45, 396 N.E.2d 761,764 (1979).
Quality control problems are worse for automobiles, however, than for any other consumer
product. While about 7% of all consumer products have warranted defects upon delivery, almost
30% of all new automobiles sold have warranted defects. Pertschuk, Consumer Automobile
Problems, 11 U.C.C. L.J. 145, 146-47 (1979). Cf. Automobile Warranty and Repair Act Hearings,
supra note 1, at 485 (comments of James G. Vorhes, Vice President, General Motors Corp.) (com-
plexity of automobiles makes defects arising during production inevitable). See generally R. NA-
DER, C. DrrLow & J. KINNARD, THE LEMON BOOK 15 (1970) [hereinafter cited as R. NADER].
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that the buyer will have an automobile substantially free of defects
soon after the sale, while it protects the dealer until he has had an op-
portunity to correct defects.8 In some instances, however, the automo-
bile suffers from serious defects that the dealer cannot remedy.9 In
other cases, the dealer resists the buyer's efforts to secure repairs under
the warranty.10 When these situations arise, the buyer may become
convinced that the dealer will never completely repair the automobile
8. Beal v. General Motors Corp., 354 F. Supp. 423, 426 (D. Del. 1973). Accord Ford Motor
Co. v. Mayes, 575 S.W.2d 480, 484 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978); Goddard v. General Motors Corp., 60
Ohio St. 41, 46, 396 N.E.2d 761,764 (1979); Murray v. Holiday Rambler, Inc., 83 Wis. 2d 406,420,
265 N.W.2d 513, 522-23 (1978). See generally Eddy, supra note 5, at 842-44 (describing dealer's
and purchaser's responsibilities for reporting and curing defects under repair or replace warranty).
In cases governed by the U.C.C., the contractually reserved exclusive remedy of repair or re-
placement precludes the buyer from asserting other remedies unless, under the circumstances, it
fails of its essential purpose. U.C.C. § 2-719(l)(b) (1978). This remedial scheme protects the seller
from liability until he has had an opportunity to attempt repairs. See, e.g., id § 2-601 (buyer may
reject nonconforming goods "unless otherwise agreed under the sections on contractual limitations
of remedy"). See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
When the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act controls, the promise to repair is a written warranty.
15 U.S.C. § 2301(6)(B) (1982). The Magnuson-Moss Act merges this remedy into the express
warranty, so that the manufacturer warrants the dealer's performance as well as the automobile's.
See id § 2301(6)(B) (defining "written warranty" to include a promise to repair). See also Eddy,
supra note 5, at 853. But cf. Hahn v. Ford Motor Co., 434 N.E.2d 943, 952 (Ind. App. 1982)
(Magnuson-Moss Act requires warrantors to make any limitations on remedies conspicuous). The
seller does not breach until he has had an adequate opportunity to repair. Hole v. General Motors
Corp., 83 A.D.2d 715, 717, 442 N.Y.S.2d 638, 640 (1981). The Act requires a buyer to allow a
supplier to attempt to comply with the terms of applicable warranties before bringing suit for
breach. 15 U.S.C. § 23 10(e) (1982).
9. The dealer's inability to remedy defects may result from several causes. In some cases the
dealer may be unable to locate the defect causing the malfunction. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v.
Mayes, 575 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (unusual noise and vibration in truck required several
mechanics to diagnose); Massingale v. Northwest Cortez, Inc., 27 Wash. App. 749, 620 P.2d 1009
(1980) (motor home that would not start when motor was hot required several months to diag-
nose). In some situations, the dealer identifies and repairs defective parts, yet the automobile
continues to malfunction. See, e.g., Tiger Motor Co. v. McMurtry, 284 Ala. 283, 224 So. 2d 638
(1969) (after numerous repairs car still misfired, skipped, burned oil and got poor gas mileage);
Pavesi v. Ford Motor Co., 155 N.J. Super. 373, 382 A.2d 954 (1978) (paint would not ahere to
automobile repainted several times). Even when the dealer has located the difficulty and cured it,
other circumstances may make it foreseeable that the automobile will never be in good repair.
See, e.g., Bayne v. Nail Motors, Inc., 12 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (Callaghan) 1137 (Iowa 1973) (auto-
mobile's entire power train probably damaged when differential "froze" while car was in motion);
Asciolla v. Manter Oldsmobile-Pontiac, Inc., 117 N.H. 85, 370 A.2d 270 (1977) (when transmis-
sion malfunctioned because automobile had been submerged, it would probably develop other
defects). In all of these cases even the dealer's good faith efforts to repair could not give the buyer
a defect-free automobile.
10. Many of these cases involve disputes over whether the warranty requires the dealer to
repair a particular defect. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Fairley, 398 So. 2d 216 (Miss. 1981) (dealer
disputed whether extended warranty coverage was still in effect when buyer demanded repairs);
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and attempt to return the "lemon" to the dealer.1' The repair or re-
place warranty, however, can severely hamper the buyer's efforts to ne-
gotiate with the dealer or manufacturer for a refund or a replacement
vehicle. 12 Indeed, the buyer often must litigate in order to receive the
relief he seeks.'3 The cost of bringing suit, however, frequently exceeds
Ehlers v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 88 S.D. 612, 226 N.W.2d 157 (1975) (dealer refused to repair
because he believed buyer had changed odometer).
Proponents of statutes regulating automobile warranties often suggest that dealers raise disputes
about warranty coverage in order to avoid performing unprofitable repairs. While speaking in
favor of proposed federal legislation H.R. 1005, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979), which would have
made the full warranty provisions of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2304 (1982),
applicable to all new automobiles, FTC Chairman Michael Pertschuk explained how the automo-
bile warranty system operates to deprive consumers of effective service.
The manufacturers have designed a warranty system primarily to control costs. Deal-
ers complain that labor rates are too low, that flat-rate time allowances are too short, and
parts mark-ups too small compared to their retail service business. As a result they feel
they are underpaid to do warranty work. They also complain about arbitrary refusals to
reimburse for work and long delays (up to 3 months) in receiving reimbursement. De-
lays in delivery of needed parts also contribute to dealer and consumer dissatisfaction
with warranty service.
Dealers undoubtedly contribute to the warranty system's failures, by assigning war-
ranty work a low priority, and by being unresponsive to consumer's reasonable expecta-
tions for service and for resolving disputes.
Automobile Warranty and Repair Act Hearings, supra note 1, at 149-50. Accord Consumer Protec-
tion in the Sale of New and Used Cars: Hearings Before the Caifornia Assembly Labor, Employ-
ment, and ConsumerAffairs Comm 139 (1979) (statement of Noel Quintana, founder of Lemon-
Aide; a consumer organization for owners of defective automobiles) (on file at Washington Univer-
sity Law Quarterly) [hereinafter cited as Calfornia Automobile Hearings]; Connecticut House of
Representatives, Debates on Substitute House Bill No. 5729, An Act Concerning Automobile
Warranties 3154 (April 20, 1982) (remarks of Rep. Zajac) (on file at Washington University Law
Quarterly) [hereinafter cited as Connecticut House Debates].
11. "[A]t some point in time, it must become obvious to all people that a particular vehicle
simply cannot be repaired or parts replaced so that the same is made free from defect." General
Motors Corp. v. Earnest, 279 Ala. 299, 302 184 So. 2d 811, 814 (1966).
There are no statistics available on the number of "lemons" produced yearly, but one author
estimates that automobile manufacturers produce more than 10,000 lemons per year. R. NADER,
supra note 7, at 16.
12. The dealer typically insists that so long as he continues to attempt repairs free of charge
he has fulfilled his obligations under the repair or replace warranty. See supra note 5 and accom-
panying text. This argument usually fails after the buyer has allowed the dealer several repair
opportunities. See, e.g., Beal v. General Motors Corp., 354 F. Supp. 423, 427 n.2 (D. Del. 1973);
Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349, 356 (Minn. 1977); Durant v. Palmetto Chev-
rolet Co., 241 S.C. 508, 514 129 S.E.2d 323, 325 (1963); Kure v. Chevrolet Motor Div., 581 P.2d
603, 608 (Wyo. 1978). Although dealers typically lose cases on this point, asserting this position
can be an effective method of avoiding the expense of resolving complaints when the dealer does
not believe the customer will bring suit. See infra notes 14, 67-68 & 172 and accompanying text.
13. An attorney giving advice to those handling warranty disputes recommends that they
follow the manufacturer's complaint handling procedure because failing to do so could defeat a
cause of action under the U.C.C. or the Magnuson-Moss Act. He also acknowledges that doing so
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the amount recoverable. 14
In response to the automobile owner's plight, several states recently
passed "lemon laws."15 These statutes compel automobile manufactur-
ers to give purchasers a refund or a replacement vehicle if, after a rea-
sonable number of attempts at repair, an automobile fails to conform to
the terms of a warranty. 6 Lemon laws also specify what constitutes a
presumptively reasonable number of attempts at repair.1 7 A consumer
might resolve the dispute. Oxenham,.Automobiles andthe Lemon Law, 7 VA. B.A.J. 18, 19 (1981).
Accord R. NADER, supra note 7, at 26.
14. The most obvious expense in bringing suit is the attorneys' fees a consumer must pay.
The economics of private litigation makes the recovery of costs and attorneys' fees
crucial remedies if private enforcement of warranties is to be a workable option for con-
sumers. Unless a consumer can be assured of recovering these costs, the consumer is
limited to recovering contract damages, generally the difference in value between the
goods as warranted (defect free) and as delivered (with unremedied defects). Even
where the consumer seeks a refund for a lemon, the car has some trade-in value, and the
true recovery is only the difference between the purchase price and this value. Often the
potentially recoverable damages are less than the likely costs of litigation.
Letter from Michael Pertschuk, FTC Chairman, to James H. Scheuer, Chairman House Subcom-
mittee on Consumer Protection and Finance (April 27, 1979) (discussing H.R. 1005, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1979)), reprinted in Caliornia Automobile Hearings, supra note 10, at 328.
Attorneys' fees are not recoverable as an element of consequential damages in a suit under the
U.C.C. Murray v. Holiday Rambler, Inc., 83 Wis. 2d 406, 435, 265 N.W.2d 513, 527 (1978). The
Magnuson-Moss Act allows awards of attorneys' fees. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2) (1982). Such
awards are discretionary, however, and commentators suggest that attorneys are reluctant to take
cases based on warranty claims if an award of fees is their only hope for payment. See Hearings
on Auto Repair Before the Subcomm on Consumer Protection and Finance of the House Comm. on
Interstate andForeign Commerce, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 200 (1979) (statement of Albert H. Kramer,
Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC); Miller & Kanter, Litigation Under Magnuson.
Moss: New Opportunities in Private Actions, 13 U.C.C. L.J. 10, 27 (1980).
Another expense to the buyer is the inconvenience of not using the car during the pendency of
the dispute. See infra notes 69-74 and accompanying text. The inefficiency of litigation as a mode
of settling warranty disputes is also costly for both individuals and consumers as a group. See
H.R. REp. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 40, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
7702, 7748-49; Pertschuk, supra note 7, at 149.
15. California and Connecticut passed the nation's first automobile lemon laws in 1982. Act
of July 7, 1982, A.B. No. 1787, 1982 Cal. Stat. ch. 388 (codified at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1793.2(e)
(Deering Supp. 1984)); Act of Oct. 1, 1982, Pub. Act No. 82-287, 1982 Conn. Acts 667 (codified at
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-179 (1983)). For the text of the Connecticut statute, see Appendix C. For
citations to lemon laws passed in 1983 see infra note 119.
16. See statutes cited infra note 119. Several states have lemon provisions applicable to all
consumer products. E.g., CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1790-1797.5 (Deering 1981); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 50-623 to -643 (1976 & Supp. 1981); MD. CoM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 14-401 to -409 (1975 &
Supp. 1982); OR. REV. STAT. § 72.8010-.8200 (1981); RI. GEN. LAWS § 6A-2-329 (1977). Unlike
automobile lemon laws, these statutes do not define a reasonable number of attempts at repair.
See infra notes 17 & 147-48 and accompanying text. See also Appendix D (provisions of state
lemon laws).
17. Most lemon laws state that 4 repair attempts on the same defect or 30 days out of service
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satisfying these statutory prerequisites18 can invoke this presumption to
shift to the manufacturer the burden of proving that an automobile is
not a lemon. 19
This Note explores the means of recovery currently available to
lemon owners. Part I shows that the Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.) creates barriers to the lemon owner's recovery. Part II dem-
onstrates that the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act does little to remove
these barriers. Part III sets out the policies legislatures sought to fur-
ther by passing lemon laws, and analyzes the ways that courts can im-
plement those policies. This Note concludes that lemon laws can
achieve the goals legislators envisioned if courts interpret them in a
manner that is consistent with the underlying policy considerations,
rather than relying on the modes of statutory analysis courts have de-
veloped under the U.C.C.
I. THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
The U.C.C.20 authorizes enforcement of the automobile manufac-
for repairs during the first year after delivery constitutes a presumptively reasonable number of
attempts at repair. Eg., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1793.2 (Deering Supp. 1983). See infra notes 147-48
and accompanying text. See also Appendix D (identifying lemon laws which incorporate this
presumption).
18. The consumer must first give notice of the automobile's defects to the dealer or manufac-
turer. See, eg., Act of June 3, 1983, ch. 83-69, § 5(4)(b)(2), 1983 Fla. Legis. Serv. 517, 522 (West)
(to be codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 681.104(4)(b)(2) (West)) ("It shall be the responsibility of the
consumer ... to give written notification to the manufacturer of the need for the repair of the
nonconformity . . . ."); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1163(1) (Supp. 1983-1984) (manufac-
turer's duty to conform a new automobile to applicable express warranties arises when "the con-
sumer reports the nonconformity to the manufacturer, its agent or its authorized dealer .... ");
NEB. REv. STAT. § 60-2704 (Supp. 1983) ("In no event shall the presumption in this section apply
against a manufacturer unless the manufacturer has received prior written direct notification by
certified mail from or on behalf of the consumer .... "). The consumer must, of course, allow
the dealer or manufacturer a reasonable number of attempts to repair the defect. See infra notes
147-50 and accompanying text. When claiming entitlement to a refund or replacement, the con-
sumer must show that a warranted defect substantially impairs the automobile. See infra notes
160-67 and accompanying text.
19. All lemon laws allow the manufacturer to rebut the statutory presumption that a specified
standard constitutes a reasonable number of repair attempts. See infra notes 154-56 and accompa-
nying text. In addition, several statutes create affirmative defenses for the manufacturer, allowing
a showing that a defect resulted from the owner's abuse or neglect of the automobile, or that its
defects do not substantially impair its use and value. See infra note 164.
20. The U.C.C., with certain local variations, regulates consumer warranties in all states ex-
cept California, Kansas, Maryland, Minnesota, Oregon and Rhode Island. See CAL. CIV. CODE
§§ 1790-1797.5 (Deering 1981 & Supp. 1983); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-623 to -643 (1976 & Supp,
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turer's standard warranty as written.2' In the event that a new automo-
bile has defects which constitute a breach of warranty, the exclusive
remedy obligates both the manufacturer and the buyer to allow the
dealer to attempt to repair or replace the defective parts.22 If the buyer
complies with the warranty by allowing the dealer several attempts to
correct defects,23 yet the automobile still fails to conform to the terms
1981); MD. CoM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 14-401 to -409 (1975 & Supp. 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 325G.17-.20 (1981); OR. REV. STAT. § 72.8010-.8200 (1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6A-2-329 (1977).
The U.C.C.'s drafters sought to implement traditional notions of freedom of contract by creat-
ing mechanisms for enforcing the terms of a bargain as made. U.C.C. § 1-102 comment 2 (1978)
("[Flreedom of contract is a principle of the Code: 'the effect' of its provisions may be varied by
'agreement' "). The U.C.C. thus eschews consumer protection in favor of "neutrality" toward
such issues.
While certain principles set forth in the Uniform Commercial Code do tend to give the
consumer greater protection than in the past, the U.C.C. is not basically directed toward
consumer protection. Indeed, one of the earlier decisions made in drafting the U.C.C.
was that it be "neutral" in the area of consumer protection. The validity and wisdom of
this "neutrality" may well be questioned. Nevertheless, it did mean that the Code was
not oriented to solving many of the major problems of consumer protection. This was
left to individual states.
D. KING, C. KUENZEL, T. LAUER, N. LITTLEFIELD & B. STONE, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1-68 (3d ed. 1981). See generally R. SPEIDEL, R. SuM-
MERS & J. WHITE, TEACHING MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER LAW 659-61 (3d ed.
1981).
21. See statutes citedsupra note 5. If the seller's promises or affirmations of fact become part
of the basis of the parties' bargain, the seller bears the risk that the product does not conform to
these express warranties. U.C.C. § 2-313(l)(a) (1978); see also id § 2-313(b), (c) (seller creates an
express warranty when description of goods becomes part of the basis of the bargain or seller uses
a sample or model to induce the sale).
Absent express contractual provisions to the contrary, the U.C.C. generally allocates the risk of
product failure to the seller through implied warranties of merchantability, U.C.C. § 2-314 (1978),
and fitness for a particular purpose, id § 2-315. The U.C.C. specifically allows the parties to a
sales transaction to reallocate the risk of product failure by excluding implied warranties and oral
express warranties. See id §§ 2-202, 2-316. See also supra note 5 (describing U.C.C.'s authoriza-
tion of each term of standard automobile warranty). The parties may also limit the buyer's reme-
dies for breach of warranty. See id § 2-719 (1978); Eddy, supra note 5, at 842-48.
Despite the U.C.C.'s explicit authorization of methods for limiting the seller's risks and liabili-
ties, courts have provided relief to purchasers when an automobile's express warranty deprived
them of a meaningful remedy. See, e.g., Courtesy Ford Sales, Inc. v. Farrior, 53 Ala. App. 94, 298
So. 2d 26, cert. denied, 292 Ala. 718, 98 So. 2d 34 (1974); Rose v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 212 Cal.
App. 2d 755, 28 Cal. Rptr. 185 (1963); Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 581
P.2d 784 (1978); Eckstein v. Cummins, 41 Ohio App. 2d 1, 321 N.E.2d 897 (1974); Moore v.
Howard Pontiac-Am., Inc., 492 S.W.2d 227 (Tenn. App. 1972).
22. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Gunn, 123 Ga. App. 550, 551, 181 S.E.2d 694, 696 (1971);
Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 340, 581 P.2d 784, 798 (1978); Hole v. General
Motors Corp., 83 A.D.2d 715, 716-17, 442 N.Y.S.2d 638, 640 (1981).
23. Some particularly tenacious buyers have allowed dealers many attempts to repair. See,
e.g.. Tiger Motor Co. v. McMurtry, 284 Ala. 283, 224 So. 2d 638 (1969) (buyer allowed dealer over
30 attempts to repair); Orange Motors v. Dade County Dairies, Inc., 258 So. 2d 319 (Fla. App.)
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of the warranty, the U.C.C. allows the buyer to pursue other reme-
dies.24 Courts consider the contractually reserved exclusive remedy to
have "failed of its essential purpose,"25 and allow the aggrieved pur-
chaser to seek other appropriate relief.2 6
The U.C.C. offers several remedies to consumers who establish that
the repair or replace remedy failed of its essential purpose.27 Among
these remedies, rejection28 and revocation of acceptance 29 are the most
(buyer had possession of auto only 6 out of first 197 days following delivery), cert. denied, 263 So.
2d 831 (Fla. 1972); Zoss v. Royal Chevrolet, Inc., 11 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (Callaghan) 527 (Ind.
1972) (during first three months after delivery automobile spent more than half its time at dealer's
for repairs).
24. U.C.C. § 2-719(2) (1978). The comments to § 2-719 set forth the rationale for refusing to
enforce a remedy which has become oppressive to one party:
[I]t is of the very essence of a sales contract that at least minimum adequate remedies be
available. If the parties intend to conclude a contract for sale within this Article they
must accept the legal consequence that there be at least a fair quantum of remedy for
breach of the obligations or duties outlined in the contract.
Id § 2-719 comment 1.
25. Id § 2-719(2).
26. See, e.g., Beal v. General Motors Corp., 354 F. Supp. 423, 426 (D. Del. 1973); Conte v.
Dwan Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 172 Conn. 112, 123, 374 A.2d 144, 149 (1976); Ford Motor Co. v.
Mayes, 575 S.W.2d 480,484 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978); Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d
349, 356 (Minn. 1977); Goddard v. General Motors Corp., 60 Ohio St. 2d 41, 45-56, 396 N.E.2d
761, 764 (1979); Ehlers v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 88 S.D. 612, 619, 226 N.W.2d 157, 161 (1975);
Murray v. Holiday Rambler, Inc., 83 Wis. 2d 406, 420, 265 N.W.2d 513, 520 (1978).
27. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 8-1. If the buyer successfully rejects or
revokes acceptance, he may "cover" under § 2-712 by purchasing similar goods and then seeking
recovery of the difference in price between the substitute goods and those returned to the seller.
Alternatively, the buyer may recover the difference between the market price for the goods re-
turned at the time he learned of the breach and the contract price under § 2-713. These additional
remedies insure that the buyer will have funds to secure goods similar to those covered by the
contract. For a full discussion of these remedies, see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, §§ 6-
3 to 6-4. Both of these remedies entitle the buyer to prove any incidental and consequential losses
suffered as a result of the seller's breach. U.C.C. §§ 2-712(2), 2-713(1), 2-715 (1978). For a
description of other buyer's remedies under the U.C.C. see infra notes 28-30 & 54.
28. The U.C.C. states that "if the goods. . . fall in any respect to conform to the contract, the
buyer may ... reject the whole." U.C.C. § 2-601 (1978). Thus, the U.C.C. incorporates the tradi-
tional "perfect tender rule" which requires a seller to tender goods that conform to each and every
term of the contract in order to create any obligation for the buyer to accept. See J. CALAMARI &
J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTs 413 (2d ed. 1977). See also U.C.C. § 2-106(2) (1978)
("Goods or conduct. . . are 'conforming'. . . when they are in accordance with the obligations
under the contract"). The primary limitation on the buyer's right to reject nonconforming goods
is the seller's right to cure nonconforming tender. Id § 2-508. The seller's right to cure creates an
obligation on the buyer to at least permit the seller to inspect the goods to determine what steps
must be taken to make them conform to the contract. Wilson v. Scampoli, 228 A.2d 848, 850
(D.C. Ct. App. 1967) (buyer's rejection of malfunctioning television set defeated because buyer
refused to allow seller to determine if it could be repaired).
Thus, the perfect tender rule has little practical effect under the U.C.C. For an analysis of the
1132
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adequate for owners who wish to rid themselves of defective
automobiles. 30 A buyer who exercises one of these remedies may can-
cel his contract with the dealer and recover payments toward the
purchase price.31 Because the U.C.C. focuses on preserving bargains it
sets stringent standards for these remedies.32
A. Rejection
Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith33 illustrates the extreme circum-
stances which must exist before courts will allow lemon owners to re-
cover pursuant to rejection.34 In Zabriskie the Smiths' automobile lost
limitations on the buyer's right to reject nonconforming goods, see generally J. WHITE & R. SUM-
MERS, supra note 5, § 8-3; Wallach, The Buyer's Right to Return Unsatisfactory Goods-The Uni-
form Commercial Code Remedies of Reection and Revocation of Acceptance, 20 WASHBURN L.J.
20, 23-28 (1980). For a discussion of the difficulties lemon owners face in attempting to reject new
automobiles, see infra notes 33-49 and accompanying text.
A buyer who cannot establish that he rightfully rejected or justifiably revoked acceptance of
goods may nonetheless recover monetary damages for breach of warranty. So long as the buyer
gives notice of the defects to the seller, he may recover damages based on the difference between
the value of the goods accepted and the value they would have had if they had been as warranted.
U.C.C. §§ 2-607, 2-714 (1978). He may also recover incidental and consequential damages. Id
§ 2-714(3).
29. See infra notes 50-70 and accompanying text. Like rejection, revocation of acceptance
allows the buyer to return nonconforming goods to the seller. See U.C.C. § 2-608 (1978).
For rejection or revocation of acceptance to be procedurally effective, a buyer must seasonably
notify the seller of any objections to the goods delivered. Id §§ 2-602(1), 2-605(1), 2-608(2).
30. Monetary damages based on a defective automobile's decreased value, U.C.C. § 2-714
(1978), cannot compensate the owner of an automobile that has irreparable defects. See cases
cited supra note 9. Theoretically the buyer may resell the defective automobile and apply its sale
price and the amount recovered as damages toward the purchase of a new automobile. In this
situation, however, the buyer faces the risk that prospective purchasers will not agree with the
court's assessment of the automobile's value in its defective condition. Also, the price of similar
automobiles may have increased since the buyer purchased the defective automobile so that he
cannot afford to replace it. Recovery pursuant to rejection or revocation of acceptance places the
risk of depreciation in the value of the goods on the selling dealer. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS,
supra note 5, § 8-1. For the lemon owner who can establish a rightful rejection or justified revoca-
tion of acceptance, the U.C.C. provides reasonably complete recovery. See also supra note 29
(rejection and revocation of acceptance allow buyer to return nonconforming goods to seller). But
see supra note 14 (describing nonrecoverable costs of bringing suit).
31. U.C.C. § 2-711(1) (1978).
32. "ITihe general policy of this Article. . . looks to preserving the deal wherever possible,
[and] therefore insists that the seller's right to correct his tender [when the buyer rejects] be pro-
tected." Id § 2-605 comment 2. See supra note 28 (seller's right to cure as a limitation on the
buyer's ability to reject). For a fuller discussion of the standards for rejection and revocation of
acceptance, see J. WHrrE & R. SuMmERS, supra note 5, § 8-3.
33. 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 (1968).
34. For other cases in which courts allowed buyers to reject, see Lloyd v. Classic Motor
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power to the transmission within a mile after leaving the dealer's show-
room. The buyer immediately notified the dealer that he wished to
cancel the sale and stopped payment on his check.35 In the dealer's suit
for payment, the court upheld the buyer's rejection, stating that the
buyer had not accepted 36 because an adequate opportunity to inspect
an automobile37 contemplates more than a "spin around the block. '38
In addition, because it was not reasonable for the dealer to believe that
the Smiths would accept an automobile that exhibited such a "remark-
able" defect within so short a time, the court found that the dealer's
attempt to cure the defects by replacing the transmission was ineffec-
tive.39 The court reasoned that the malfunction had shaken the Smiths'
faith in the automobile's integrity and reliability, making cure
impossible.4°
Coaches, Inc., 388 F. Supp. 785 (N.D. Ohio 1974) (purchaser of Rolls-Royce delivered with de-
fects costing several thousand dollars to repair allowed to reject almost three weeks after delivery
when automobile spent most of that time in garage); Bayne v. Nail Motors, 12 U.C.C. REP. SERV.
(Callaghan) 1137 (Iowa 1973) (buyer allowed to reject where differential "froze" after 400 miles
creating a risk of additional mechanical difficulties with the automobile).
35. 99 N.J. Super. at 445, 240 A.2d at 197.
36. Acceptance puts an end to the buyer's right to reject. U.C.C. § 2-607 (1978). The U.C.C.
provides for three methods of accepting goods.
Acceptance of goods occurs when the buyer
(a) after a reasonable opportunity to inspect the goods signifies to the seller that the
goods are conforming or that he will take or retain them in spite of their noncon-
formity; or
(b) fails to make an effective rejection (subsection (1) of Section 2-602), but such ac-
ceptance does not occur until the buyer has had a reasonable opportunity to inspect
them; or
(c) does any act inconsistent with the seller's ownership; but if such act is wrongful as
against the seller it is an acceptance only if ratified by him.
Id § 2-606(1).
Some courts find acceptance based solely on the act of taking possession of the automobile. See,
e.g., American Imports, Inc. v. G.E. Employees Credit Union, 37 N.C. App. 121, 124-25, 245
S.E.2d 798, 800-01 (1978); Rozmus v. Thompson's Lincoln-Mercury Co., 209 Pa. Super. 120, 123,
224 A.2d 782, 784 (1966). See also infra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
37. Two of the three methods of accepting goods under the U.C.C. operate only when the
buyer has had an adequate opportunity to inspect. U.C.C. § 2-606(l)(a)-(b) (1978).
The court acknowledged the difficulties in determining whether an automobile has defects: "To
the layman, the complicated mechanisms of today's automobiles are a complete mystery. To have
the automobile inspected by someone with sufficient expertise to disassemble the vehicle in order
to discover latent defects before the contract is signed, is assuredly impossible and highly impracti-
cal.' 99 N.J. Super. at 453, 240 A.2d at 202.
38. 99 N.J. Super. at 453, 240 A.2d at 202. Thus, the court found that there had been no
acceptance under the applicable statute. N.J. REV. STAT. § 12A:2-606 (1962).
39. 99 N.J. Super. at 458, 240 A.2d at 205. See N.J. REV. STAT. § 12A:2-508 (1962). See
generally Wallach, supra note 28, at 24-28 (limitations on seller's right to cure).
40. 99 N.J. Super. at 458, 240 A.2d at 205. The court found that:
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol61/iss4/8
Number 4] LEMON LAWS 1135
B. Acceptance
A number of courts have recognized that the U.C.C.'s requirement of
an adequate opportunity to inspect goods for defects4' means that ac-
ceptance does not necessarily occur when a buyer takes possession of
an automobile.42 Other courts, however, have refused to recognize a
purchaser's right to reject after an automobile is driven from the
dealer's showroom. 43 Because most lemons do not begin malfunction-
ing as quickly, or with such severity, as did the automobile in
Zabriskie,4 rarely does the buyer learn of defects in time to reject.45 In
addition, the U.C.C. provides that, regardless of an opportunity to in-
spect, a buyer's conduct that is inconsistent with the seller's ownership
of defective goods may constitute acceptance. 46  When the manufac-
turer's exclusive remedy precludes rejection until after the dealer has
failed several times to effect repairs,47 a buyer can seldom avoid acting
For a majority of people the purchase of a new car is a major investment, rationalized by
the peace of mind that flows from its dependability and safety. Once their faith is
shaken, the vehicle loses not only its real value in their eyes, but becomes an instrument
whose integrity is substantially impaired and whose operation is fraught with
apprehension.
Id
41. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
42. See, e.g., Lloyd v. Classic Motor Coaches, Inc., 388 F. Supp. 785, 790 (N.D. Ohio 1974);
Asciolla v. Manter Oldsmobile-Pontiac, Inc., 117 N.H. 85, 88, 370 A.2d 270, 273 (1977); Zabriskie
Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 452-53 240 A.2d 195, 202 (1968).
43. See, e.g., Pavesi v. Ford Motor Co., 155 N.J. Super. 373, 376, 382 A.2d 954, 956 (1978).
See also cases cited infra note 49. But see Bayne v. Nail Motors, 12 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (Calla-
ghan) 1137 (Iowa 1973) (buyer allowed to reject automobile that malfunctioned four days after
delivery).
44. See THE LEMON FILE (Consumer Press) Case Profile Nos. 0001-1 to 0160-1 (case summa-
ries describing defect and time it appeared compiled by the Center for Auto Safety, Washington,
D.C.). See also supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
45. See cases cited supra note 34. While a buyer who revokes acceptance need only notify
the dealer within a reasonable time after discovery of the defect, or within a reasonable time after
the defect should have been discovered, U.C.C. § 2-608(2) (1978), one who rejects must notify the
dealer within a reasonable time after delivery, id § 2-602(1). See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra
note 5, § 8-3. The circumstances surrounding the sale of an automobile make it unlikely that a
buyer will be able to discover defects. A salesman typically reassures the buyer that the car is in
good condition, and that if any defects are found, the buyer need only make a list and the dealer
will repair them free of charge. Thus, the buyer has little reason to make a careful inspection at
the time of delivery. See Highsmith & Havens, Revocation of Acceptance and the Defective Auto-
mobile: The Uniform Commercial Code to the Rescue, 18 AM. Bus. L.J. 303, 315-16 (1980).
46. U.C.C. § 2-606(l)(c) (1978). See supra note 36.
47. See supra notes 5, 8 & 21-22. The U.C.C. specifically acknowledges the parties' right to
preclude rejection as a remedy. See U.C.C. § 2-601 (1978) ("[U]nless otherwise agreed under the
sections on contractual limitations of remedy. . . if the goods. . . fail in any respect to conform
to the contract, the buyer may ... reject the whole").
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inconsistently with the seller's ownership. Because acceptance bars any
demand for relief based on rejection,48 most buyers must rely on the
remedy of revocation of acceptance in order to secure a refund.49
C. Revocation of Acceptance
Revocation of acceptance allows a buyer to cancel a contract of sale,
after acceptance when the seller's opportunity to cure has passed.50 Be-
cause it is a drastic remedy, the U.C.C. sets strict standards for revoca-
tion of acceptance.5' The revoking buyer has the burden of proving52
that the automobile does not conform to the warranties in the sales
contract,53 and, further, that the nonconformities "substantially im-
pair" the value of the automobile to the buyer.54 By the terms of the
48. Id § 2-607(2).
49. Courts often avoid an explicit finding that acceptance has occurred. Rather, they assume
it has taken place in cases that can be decided on the basis of revocation of acceptance. See, e.g.,
Hahn v. Ford Motor Co., 434 N.E.2d 943 (Ind. App. 1982); Asciolla v. Manter Oldsmobile-Pon-
tiac, Inc., 117 N.H. 85, 370 A.2d 270 (1977); Pavesi v. Ford Motor Co., 155 N.J. Super. 373, 382
A.2d 954 (1978).
50. U.C.C. § 2-608 (1978). See supra notes 28-29, 31 & 36 and accompanying text.
51. See U.C.C. § 2-608 (1978); see also infra note 52 (revoking buyer has burden of proof to
establish defects).
52. See id § 2-607 (burden of proof is on buyer after acceptance). In cataloging the advan-
tages of rejection over revocation of acceptance, one commentator noted that in rejection cases the
burden of proof is on the seller to establish that the tender conformed to the contract. Wallach,
supra note 28, at 21.
In order to justify revocation of acceptance, a buyer must prove:
(1) [T~he goods are nonconforming;
(2) the nonconformity substantially impairs the value of the goods to the buyer;,
(3) the buyer accepted the goods on the reasonable assumption that the nonconformity
would be cured;
(4) the nonconformity could not have been seasonably cured;
(5) the buyer notified the seller of revocation;
(6) revocation occurred within a reasonable time after the buyer discovered or should
have discovered the ground for it and before any substantial change in condition of the
goods which is not caused by their own defects; and
(7) the buyer took reasonable care of the goods for which acceptance has been revoked.
Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349, 353 (Minn. 1977).
53. See Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349, 351 (Minn. 1977). See also
supra note 52.
54. See U.C.C. § 2-608(1) (1978). See also cases cited infra note 59 (demonstrating that
courts use wide variety of standards for determining substantial impairment).
The U.C.C. also requires a revoking buyer to notify the seller of defects in the goods within a
reasonable time after discovery and before any substantial change occurs in the goods that is not
due to their own defects. U.C.C. § 2-608(2) (1978). This prerequisite seldom has prevented recov-
ery by revoking buyers. See, e.g., Tiger Motor Co. v. McMurtry, 284 Ala. 283, 293, 224 So. 2d
638, 647 (1969) (reasons for allowing a buyer to revoke acceptance after dealer fails to cure out-
weigh any prejudice dealer might suffer if forced to accept return of automobile which has logged
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manufacturer's standard warranty, the buyer must show that the auto-
mobile's malfunctioning results from a defect in material or workman-
ship.55 Some courts require the buyer to prove precisely what parts of
the automobile contain defects and that those defects caused the mal-
function.56 Other courts hold that evidence that an automobile mal-
functioned during the warranty period creates an inference that a
warranted defect exists.57 Even in these jurisdictions the lemon owner
may need to adduce expert testimony to rebut evidence that a mal-
function resulted from other causes.58
Judicial attempts to insure that automobile purchasers do not revoke
acceptance on the basis of trivial or easily corrected defects have pro-
duced an array of standards for determining whether an automobile's
substantial mileage); Zoss v. Royal Chevrolet, Inc., 11 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (Callaghan) 527, 532
(Ind. 1972) (when dealer's promises to repair delays buyer's action of revoking acceptance, dealer
cannot claim lack of adequate notice of buyer's revocation).
The U.C.C. requires a revoking buyer to establish an excuse for accepting nonconforming
goods. U.C.C. § 2-608(1) (1978). See supra note 52. This requirement also seldom precludes
recovery because the standard automobile warranty itself not only assures the buyer that the auto-
mobile has no defects, but also promises that the dealer will repair any defects that do appear. See
Appendices A & B. Comment 3 to § 2-608 sets out the reasons for allowing these assurances to
excuse the buyer's failure to reject: "'Assurances' by the seller under paragraph (b) of subsection
(1) [assurances inducing failure to discover] can rest as well in the circumstances or in the contract
as in the explicit language used at the time of delivery. The reason for recognizing such assur-
ances is that they induce the buyer to delay discovery." U.C.C. § 2-608 comment 3 (1978). See
supra note 45. In addition, the complexity of the average automobile certainly justifies the buyer's
acceptance of an automobile without discovery of latent defects. See supra note 37 and accompa-
nying text. Thus, the buyer usually has few difficulties in justifying acceptance of a lemon. See
Havens & Highsmith, supra note 45, at 315-16.
55. When the buyer alleges breach of warranty as the basis for revocation of acceptance, he
must show that the goods fail to conform to the contract specifications. See U.C.C. §§ 2-608, 2-
106 (1978). See also Clark v. Ford Motor Co., 46 Or. App. 521, 612 P.2d 316 (1980) (when seller
disclaimed all warranties in sale of an individual identified automobile, defects did not make it
nonconforming to any contract term). But cf. Seekings v. Jimmy GMC of Tucson, Inc., 130 Ariz.
596, 638 P.2d 210 (1981) (when seller disclaimed all warranties relief still allowed against seller on
manufacturer's warranty because seller did not represent vehicle as one sold with no warranties).
56. See Collum v. Fred Tuch Buick, 6 Ill. App. 3d 317, 322, 285 N.E.2d 532, 536 (1972) (the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply to show that a malfunction results from a defect in
material or workmanship).
57. See A.A.A. Exteriors, Inc. v. Don Mahurin Chevrolet & Oldsmobile, Inc., 429 N.E.2d
975, 978 (Ind. App. 1981) (proof of a malfunction, absent other causes, leads to an inference of a
defect in material or workmanship).
58. E.g.. Bayne v. Nall Motors, Inc., 12 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (Callaghan) 1137 (Iowa 1973);
Ford Motor Co. v. Mayes, 575 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. App. 1978); Champion Ford Sales, Inc. v. Levine,
49 Md. App. 547, 433 A.2d 1218 (1981); Schrimpfv. General Motors Corp., No. 81-921 (Wis. Ct.
App. March 10, 1982).
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defects "substantially impair" its value to the buyer.59 In Asciolla v.
Manter Oldsmobile-Pontiac, Inc.,6 the New Hampshire Supreme
Court articulated a reasonably coherent standard for determining
whether an automobile's defects substantially impair its value to the
purchaser.61 This standard requires the fact-finder to assess the buyer's
particular needs and expectations and then determine whether such a
buyer could reasonably find that the automobile's defects substantially
impair its value.62 This test does not indicate, however, the weight a
59. Compare Koperski v. Husker Dodge, Inc., 208 Neb. 29, 41, 302 N.W.2d 655, 662 (1981)
(substantial impairment not found when cost of repairs was not great) and Massingale v. North-
west Cortez, Inc., 27 Wash. App. 749, 752, 620 P.2d 1009, 1011 (1980) (trial courts must make
determination of substantial impairment on objective basis) with Tiger Motor Co. v. McMurtry,
284 Ala. 283, 292, 224 So. 2d 638, 646 (1969) (each case must be examined on its merits to deter-
mine substantial impairment) and Pavesi v. Ford Motor Co., 155 N.J. Super. 373, 378, 382 A.2d
954, 956 (1978) (buyer may revoke when value of car to buyer is marred by defects) and Testo v.
Russ Dunmire Oldsmobile, Inc., 16 Wash. App. 39, 48, 554 P.2d 349, 356 (1976) (buyer may
revoke when defect shakes buyer's faith in the automobile).
The language of § 2-608(1) indicates that the fact finder should base this determination on the
buyer's subjective expectations. U.C.C. § 2-608(1) (1978). As stated in comment 2 to § 2-608:
Revocation of acceptance is possible only where the nonconformity substantially im-
pairs the value of the goods to the buyer. mhe question is whether the nonconformity as
such will in fact cause a substantial impairment of value to the buyer though the seller
had no advance knowledge as to the buyer's particular circumstances.
Id comment 2. See also Highsmith & Havens, supra note 45, at 310 (test for substantial impair-
ment may allow particularly careful buyer to revoke acceptance when defect would be insufficient
to allow revocation by "normal" buyer); Note, Revocation ofAcceptance: The Testfor Substantial
Impairment, 32 U. PITT. L. REv. 439, 447 (1971) (buyer must show tht defect substantially impairs
value of goods to him by introducing objective evidence).
Despite this statutory language, courts have struggled to inject an objective element into the test.
See Conte v. Dwan Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 172 Conn. 112, 121, 374 A.2d 144, 148 (1976) (buyer
cannot reject for trivial or easily repaired defects); Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports, Inc., 262
N.W.2d 349, 354 (Minn. 1977) (defects not interfering with automobile's operation do not substan-
tially impair its value); Koperski v. Husker Dodge, Inc., 208 Neb. 29, 41, 302 N.W.2d 655, 662
(1981) (defects which can be repaired for a fraction of the automobile's purchase price do not
substantially impair its value); Moore v. Howard Pontiac-Am., Inc., 492 S.W.2d 227, 229 (Tenn.
App. 1972) (automobile substantially impaired when repairs would cost about 25% of sale price);
Reece v. Yeager Ford Sales, Inc., 155 W. Va. 453, 458-59, 184 S.E.2d 722, 729-30 (1971) (minor
defects which the dealer offers to repair cannot constitute substantial impairment of value).
60. 117 N.H. 85, 370 A.2d 270 (1977).
61. 117 N.H. at 88-89, 370 A.2d at 273. Several courts have cited theAsciolla standard with
approval. See, e.g., Keen v. Modem Trailer Sales, Inc., 578 P.2d 668, 670 (Colo. App. 1978);
Koperski v. Husker Dodge, Inc., 208 Neb. 29, 41-42, 302 N.W.2d 655, 662 (1981); Werner v.
Montana, 117 N.H. 721, 730, 378 A.2d 1130, 1136 (1977); Pavesi v. Ford Motor Co., 155 N.J.
Super. 373, 378, 382 A.2d 954, 956 (1978).
62. This section [§ 2-608 of the U.C.C.] therefore, creates a subjective test in the sense
that the needs and circumstances of the particular buyer must be examined. This deter-
mination is not, however, made by reference to the buyer's personal belief as to the
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court should assign to any particular consideration. 63 Because the out-
come in many cases hinges on the balance a court strikes between the
objective and subjective elements of substantial impairment, a great
deal of uncertainty exists in revocation of acceptance litigation.'
A purchaser asserting revocation of acceptance as the basis for recov-
ery bears a formidable burden of proof.65 Failure to prove any one of
the elements of revocation of acceptance can be fatal to the buyer's
claim.66 The difficulty of establishing this claim and the expense of
litigation deter consumers who have legitimate claims from bringing
suit.67 In addition, infrequent litigation gives dealers little incentive to
negotiate satisfactory settlements with lemon owners.
68
D. Using the Automobile After Rejection or Revocation
Even when the buyer properly rejects or revokes acceptance, subse-
quent use of the automobile can defeat any right to recovery.69 Most
courts insist that, upon rejecting or revoking acceptance, the buyer re-
reduced value of the goods in question. The trier of fact must make an objective deter-
mination that the value of the goods to the buyer has in fact been substantially impaired.
117 N.H. at 88-89, 370 A.2d at 273.
63. This becomes apparent in examining cases which have cited the 4sciolla standard yet
arrive at divergent results in similar factual situations. See Koperski v. Husker Dodge, Inc., 208
Neb. 29, 41-42, 302 N.W.2d 655, 662 (1981) (court cited test in refusing to allow revocation be-
cause cost of repair was minimal); Pavesi v. Ford Motor Co., 155 N.J. Super. 373, 378, 382 A.2d
954, 956 (1978) (court cited test in allowing revocation where paint defects marred appearance and
value of automobile to owner).
64. See Highsmith & Havens, supra note 45, at 310-13; Wallach, supra note 28, at 32-38. See
also Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349, 353 (Minn. 1977) ("[T]he language of
the statute hardly provides a sensitive gauge to test the justification for any particular
revocation").
65. Wallach, supra note 28, at 21. See U.C.C. § 2-607(4) (1978) (buyer must establish any
breach with respect to goods accepted). See also supra note 52.
66. See supra notes 52 & 65.
67. Litigation costs may well exceed the purchase price of a lemon and the amount a con-
sumer could hope to recover. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
68. See California Automobile Hearings, supra note 10, at 139-40 (statement of Noel
Quintana, founder of Lemon-Aide). See also Pertschuk, supra note 7, at 147 (dealers often urge
consumers to "cut losses" by selling defective automobiles).
69. Under the U.C.C., one who revokes acceptance of nonconforming goods "has the same
rights and duties with regard to the goods involved as if he had rejected them." U.C.C. § 2-608(3)
(1978). Therefore, both consumers who reject and those who revoke acceptance of a defective
automobile are bound by the U.C.C.'s provision that "after rejection any exercise of ownership by
the buyer with respect to any commercial unit is wrongful as against the seller." Id § 2-602(2)(a).
Because subsequent use of the automobile is an act inconsistent with the seller's ownership of the
goods, the lemon owner can defeat his recovery by reaccepting the automobile. See supra note 36.
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turn the automobile to the dealer or store it as security against a re-
fund.70 A few courts, recognizing the hardship this requirement
imposes on the average automobile purchaser,7" have held that contin-
ued use after rejection or revocation of acceptance does not defeat an
otherwise proper claim.72 These courts supplement the U.C.C.'s dam-
age measures with equitable principles73 and compensate the dealer for
the value of the continued use.7 4
E. Vertical Privity Under the U C. C.
Normally a buyer will seek recovery against both the dealer who sold
him the lemon and the manufacturer who set the terms of its war-
ranty.75 Most courts hold that a buyer rejecting or revoking acceptance
of an automobile may recover only against the selling dealer.76 Suc-
cessfully rejecting or revoking acceptance allows a buyer to cancel his
contract with a seller.77 Courts therefore find that rejecting or revoking
acceptance is inappropriate against a manufacturer that is not in privity
70. See, e.g., Waltz v. Chevrolet Motor Div., 307 A.2d 815 (Del. Super. Ct. 1973); Charney v.
Ocean Pontiac, Inc., 17 U.C.C. REP. SERv. (Callaghan) 982 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1975); Ficek v.
Capindale, 54 Pa. D. & C.2d 701 (1971); Grucella v. General Motors Corp., 10 Pa. D. & C.2d 65
(1956).
71. See Pavesi v. Ford Motor Co., 155 N.J. Super. 373, 377, 382 A.2d 954, 956 (1978).
72. Courts allow continued use after rejection or revocation of acceptance when the auto is a
necessity to the buyer. See, e.g., Orange Motors v. Dade County Dairies, Inc., 258 So. 2d 319 (Fla.
App.), cert. denied, 263 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 1972); Pavesi v. Ford Motor Co., 155 N.J. Super. 373, 382
A.2d 954 (1978); Moore v. Howard Pontiac-Am., Inc., 492 S.W.2d 227 (Tenn. App. 1972).
73. See U.C.C. § 1-103 (1978) (principles of law and equity apply where not displaced by
U.C.C. provisions).
74. These courts allow a set-off against the buyer's recovery for the value of the buyer's con-
tinued use. See cases cited supra note 72.
75. See Wallach, supra note 28, at 38. See also, e.g., Beal v. General Motors Corp., 354 F.
Supp. 423 (D. Del. 1973); Seekings v. Jimmy GMC of Tucson, Inc., 130 Ariz. 596, 638 P.2d 210
(1981); Conte v. Dwan Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 172 Conn. 112, 374 A.2d 144 (1976); Gates v.
Chrysler Corp., 397 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. App. 1981); Royal Lincoln-Mercury Sales, Inc. v. Wallace,
415 So. 2d 1024 (Miss. 1982); Welch v. Fitzgerald-Hicks Dodge, Inc., 121 N.H. 358, 430 A.2d 144
(1981); Ventura v. Ford Motor Corp., 180 NJ. Super. 45, 433 A.2d 801 (1981); Clark v. Ford
Motor Co., 46 Or. App. 521, 612 P.2d 316 (1980); Murray v. Holiday Rambler, Inc., 83 Wis. 2d
406, 265 N.W.2d 513 (1978).
76. E.g., Voytovich v. Bangor Punta Operations, Inc., 494 F.2d 1208 (6th Cir. 1974); Seekings
v. Jimmy GMC of Tucson, Inc., 130 Ariz. 596, 638 P.2d 210 (1981); Conte v. Dwan Lincoln-
Mercury, Inc., 172 Conn. 112, 374 A.2d 144 (1976); Volvo of Am. Corp. v. Wells, 551 S.W.2d 826
(Ky. Ct. App. 1977); Edelstein v. Toyota Motors Distrib., 176 N.J. Super. 57, 422 A.2d 101 (1980);
Clark v. Ford Motor Co., 46 Or. App. 521, 612 P.2d 316 (1980); Reece v. Yeager Ford Sales, Inc.,
155 W. Va. 453, 184 S.E.2d 722 (1971).
77. U.C.C. § 2-711(1) (1978).
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of contract with the buyer.78 Because the dealer, as a franchisee, does
not act as the manufacturer's agent in selling the automobile,79 claims
for relief against the manufacturer pursuant to rejection or revocation
of acceptance ordinarily fail 8° for lack of privity.81
Courts generally allow recovery for breach of an express warranty
directly against the manufacturer of a defective automobile if the buyer
claims only damages for its diminished value rather than a refund of its
purchase price.82 The dealer in these cases merely acts as a conduit,
transmitting the express warranty from the manufacturer to the con-
sumer.83 Because the buyer's recovery does not result in cancellation of
the contract of sale, courts relax the privity requirement. 84
When a buyer bases rejection or revocation of acceptance on an au-
78. See cases cited supra note 76.
79. "[Nlormally dealers in new automobiles, although commonly spoken of as agents, are
purchasers from the manufacturers, their only attribute as agents being to extend to purchasers
from them the limited warranty of the manufacturers." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 14J comment e.
80. See cases cited supra note 76. Contra Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d
349 (Minn. 1977). In Dulfee the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that the plaintiff could revoke
acceptance against a distributor despite the absence of privity. Because the manufacturer used the
automobile's warranty as a sales tool and the distributor profited indirectly from the sale to the
plaintiff, the court saw no reason to block plaintiffs recovery merely because the selling dealer had
gone out of business. 262 N.W.2d at 357-58.
81. Parties who have contracted with each other are said to be "in privity." There are
two basic kinds of "non-privity" plaintiffs. The "vertical" non-privity plaintiffis a buyer
within the distributive chain who did not buy directly from the defendant. The "hori-
zontal" non-privity plaintiff is not a buyer within the distributive chain but one who
consumes or uses or is affected by the goods.
J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, § 11-2, at 399. The U.C.C. specifies which horizontal non-
privity plaintiffs can recover. U.C.C. § 2-318 (1978) (three differing versions of statute provided).
The drafters left state legislatures and courts to determine the rules for vertical privity which
would apply in each state. See id § 2-318 comment 2. See also Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa.
217, 233, 246 A.2d 848, 856 (1968) (drafters of the U.C.C. sought to regulate only horizontal
privity).
Because this Note explores legal relations between the parties primarily during the first year of
ownership of an automobile, during which resale of the automobile is rare, the doctrines relating
to horizontal privity are of little relevance.
82. See, e.g., Riley v. Ford Motor Co., 442 F.2d 670 (5th Cir. 1971); Conte v. Dwan Lincoln-
Mercury, Inc., 172 Conn. 112, 374 A.2d 144 (1976); Gates v. Chrysler Corp., 397 So. 2d 1187 (Fla.
App. 1981); Koperski v. Husker Dodge, Inc., 208 Neb. 29, 302 N.W.2d 655 (1981); Goddard v.
General Motors Corp., 60 Ohio St. 2d 41, 396 N.E.2d 761 (1979); Ehlers v. Chrysler Motor Corp.,
88 S.D. 612, 226 N.W.2d 157 (1975); Reece v. Yeager Ford Sales, Inc., 155 W. Va. 453, 184 S.E.2d
722 (1971); Schrimpf v. General Motors Corp., No. 81-921 (Wis. Ct. App. March 10, 1982).
83. See cases cited supra note 82. See generally J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 5, § II-
5.
84. See cases cited supra note 82.
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tomobile's failure to conform to the terms of a manufacturer's express
warranty, it seems anomalous for courts to deny these remedies be-
cause the buyer is not in privity of contract with the manufacturer.85
The courts' reasoning on privity dictates that a single breach could sup-
port an action for damages against the manufacturer or an action for a
refund of the purchase price from the dealer,86 without regard for their
relative abilities to control defects or redistribute losses.87  Thus, the
U.C.C.'s insistence on preserving the parties' bargain often places the
economic loss resulting from a manufacturer's production mistakes on
automobile dealers who can do little to redistribute these costs and al-
most nothing to prevent them. 8
II. THE MAGNUSON-MOSS WARRANTY ACT
The Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Im-
85. The court in Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349 (Minn. 1977), relied on
this anomaly and the U.C.C.'s mandate in favor of liberal administration of remedies to allow
revocation against the distributor. "If plaintiff had sued Saab Scania for breach of either express
warranty or implied warranty, the absence of privity would not bar the suit despite the language
of the pertinent Code sections." Id at 357.
Although the goods-oriented remedies of rejection and revocation of acceptance do not account
for the manufacturer's receiving less than the retail price that the buyer paid to the dealer for the
automobile, neither do monetary damages. In cases based on breach of warranty, courts will
determine damages based on the automobile's diminution in value by comparing the automobile's
value in its defective condition with its original retail price. See, e.g., Riley v. Ford Motor Co.,
442 F.2d 670 (5th Cir. 1971) (upon determining that automobile was worthless in its defective
condition, the court could award its retail purchase price as damages for breach of warranty).
Thus, differentiating between a damages award against the manufacturer and a goods-oriented
remedy against the dealer on the basis of the manufacturer's receiving only the wholesale price for
the automobile originally seems unwarranted.
86. Gates v. Chrysler Corp., 397 So. 2d 1187, 1189 (Fla. App. 1981) (plaintiffwho establishes
facts sufficient to show revocation of acceptance, also shows facts sufficient to establish breach of
warranty). See Ventura v. Ford Motor Corp., 180 N.J. Super. 45, 64, 433 A.2d 801, 810 (1981).
87. See generally Preist, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297,
1346-51 (1981) (arguing that level of warranty coverage influences investments manufacturer will
make in quality control); Schwartz, The Manufacturer'r Liability to the Purchaser of a "Lemon's A
Review ofthe Situation in Canada after General Motors Products of Canada, Ltd. v. Kravitz, 11
OTrAWA L. REv. 583, 584-91 (1979) (arguing that manufacturer's control over production and
distribution justifies holding manufacturer liable to remote purchaser).
88. The primary reason for altering the current patterns of warranty recovery, according to
one commentator, is to facilitate quality control.
In the first place, the manufacturer and not the retailer is in most cases responsible for
the existence of the defects in issue. The chronic defects that afflict the typical lemon
nearly always have their origin in faulty design, manufacture, or assembly; factors under
the control of the manufacturer rather than the dealer. The manufacturer rather than
the dealer determines the quality of what the purchaser receives.
Schwartz, supra note 87, at 585.
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provement Act of 1975 (the Act) 9 creates few remedial obligations that
a warrantor cannot avoid by offering a "limited" warranty. 90 Most au-
tomobile manufacturers, therefore, now offer limited warranties which
vary from the traditional standard warranty9' only insofar as they must
to comply with the Act's disclosure requirements92 and limitations on
disclaimers of implied warranties. 93 The Act's primary benefit to
lemon owners lies in its authorization of discretionary awards of attor-
89, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1982). The Act supplements state and federal warranty laws,
but does not displace any rights or remedies available to consumers under state or federal law. Id
§ 231 l(b)(l). Although the Act focuses primarily on protecting consumers through full disclosure
of warranty terms, see id § 2302, it also prohibits disclaimers of implied warranties, id § 2308(a),
and thus limits a warrantor's nearly absolute freedom under the U.C.C. to allocate risks of prod-
uct failure to consumers. See supra notes 5 & 21 and accompanying text.
The Act applies only to written warranties, which differ somewhat from express warranties
under the U.C.C.:
The term "written warranty" means-
(A) any written affirmation of fact or written promise made in connection with the
sale of a consumer product by a supplier to a buyer which relates to the nature of the
material or workmanship and affirms or promises that such material or workmanship is
defect free or will meet a specified level of performance over a specified period of time,
or
(B) any undertaking in writing in connection with the sale by a supplier of a con-
sumer product to refund, repair, replace, or take other remedial action with respect to
such product in the event that such product fails to meet the specifications set forth in the
undertaking, which written affirmation, promise, or undertaking becomes part of the
basis of the bargain between supplier and a buyer for purposes other than resale of such
product.
15 U.S.C. § 2301(6) (1982). Cf. supra note 8 (promise to repair is warranty under Act, but remedy
under U.C.C.).
90. While the Act sets federal minimum standards for "full warranties," 15 U.S.C. § 2304
(1982), it does not make any standard mandatory for any warrantor. Id § 2302(b)(2). A warran-
tor who offers a limited warranty need only comply with the Act's disclosure requirements and
prohibitions on disclaimers of implied warranties. In fact, the Act forbids the FTC from mandat-
ing warranty terms. Id § 2302(b)(2).
The Act does require any warrantor who offers a written warranty to conspicuously label it
"full" or "limited." Id § 2303. Congress imposed this requirement to help consumers differenti-
ate more readily among products on the basis of warranty coverage. Thus, competitive forces
should provide an incentive for suppliers to offer full warranties. See Brickey, supra note 4, at 74-
79. But cf. id at 96 (little competition among suppliers on basis of warranty despite full/limited
regulatory scheme of the Act).
91. FTC SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 3, at 48. See, e.g., Appendix B. See also Pertschuk,
supra note 7, at 148-49 (full warranties a rarity in automobile industry).
92. The Act authorizes the FTC to make extensive regulations governing disclosure of war-
ranty terms. 15 U.S.C. § 2302 (1982). See 16 C.F.R. §§ 700.1-703.8 (1983).
93. Section 2308(a) prohibits any supplier who offers a written warranty from disclaiming
any implied warranties arising under state law. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2308, 2301(7) (1982). If the supplier
offers a limited warranty, however, he may limit the duration of any implied warranties to that of
the written warranty. Id § 2308(b).
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neys' fees to successful litigants.94
Although the Act creates a federal cause of action for breach of a
limited warranty,95 it does not specify the measure of damages recover-
able.96 Most courts have relied on state law to determine the remedies
available to consumers under the Act.97 Thus, a lemon owner must still
establish a rightful rejection9 or justified revocation of acceptance99 to
receive a refund."°
The U.C.C.'s remedial scheme allows owners to recover refunds only
from the dealer who sold the automobile.10 1 The Act's enforcement
provisions, however, apply only to suits against a person who actually
makes a written warranty.102 Because automobile dealers merely trans-
mit a manufacturer's written warranty to purchasers, a lemon owner
cannot bring suit against a dealer under the Act."13 Thus, on its face
94. Id § 2310(a)(2). See supra note 14. See also Brickey, supra note 4, at 80 n.41 (attorneys'
fees vital to the enforcement of consumers' rights).
95. "[A] consumer who is damaged by the failure of a supplier, warrantor, or service contrac-
tor to comply with any obligation ... under a written warranty, implied warranty or service
contract, may bring suit for damages and other legal and equitable relief." 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1)
(1982). An individual consumer usually can bring suit only in state court, however, because the
Act allows suits in federal courts only when the amount in controversy exceeds $50,000. Id
§ 2310(d)(3)(B).
The Act forbids a consumer to bring suit until the warrantor has had an opportunity "to cure
his failure to comply." Id § 2310(e). The Act also requires a consumer to resort to a qualified
informal dispute settlement mechanism before bringing suit if the warrantor gives notice of this
procedure in the written warranty. Id § 2310(3). See, e.g., Appendix B.
The Act empowers the FTC to determine the minimum requirements for an informal dispute
settlement procedure. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(2) (1982). The FTC's rule on informal dispute settle-
ment procedures sets out exceedingly detailed requirements for a warrantor who wishes to create
such a mechanism. In addition to complex staffing and recordkeeping provisions, the rule con-
tains the basic standards for the program's operation: (1) the decisionmaker must generally reach
a result within 40 days; (2) that result does not bind the consumer, but does bind the manufacturer
if the consumer chooses to accept it; (3) the decisionmaker must allow a party to the dispute the
opportunity to refute contradictory evidence offered by the other; (4) the manufacturer must com-
plete any work required within 30 days; (5) invoking an informal dispute settlement mechanism
tolls the statute of limitations during the mechanism's operation. 16 C.F.R. § 703.5 (1983).
96. See 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1) (1982).
97. See MacKenzie v. Chrysler Corp., 607 F.2d 1162 (5th Cir. 1979); Novosel v. Northway
Motor Car Corp., 460 F. Supp. 541 (N.D.N.Y. 1978). "The present 'lemon' provision of
Magnuson-Moss [15 U.S.C. § 2304 (1982)] also applies only to 'full' warranties, so consumers with
a lemon [automobile] must still look to state law for relief." Pertschuk, supra note 7, at 149.
98. See supra notes 28 & 33-40 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 29 & 50-74 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
102. 15 U.S.C. § 2310(f) (1982).
103. The Act specifies that a person designated by the warrantor to perform warranty services
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the Act does not appear to improve the lemon owner's ability to re-
cover both a refund and attorney's fees.104 Indeed, many courts simply
hold that the Act does not provide any remedy for breach of a limited
warranty.10 5
Some courts, however, allow a lemon owner to join a state law claim
against the dealer for a refund with a federal claim against the manu-
facturer for damages pursuant to breach of warranty. 10 6 These courts
reason that because the dealer acts as the manufacturer's agent for per-
forming warranty obligations,"° a buyer who establishes a breach of
warranty sufficient to support rejection or revocation against the dealer
a fortiori establishes the same breach against the manufacturer. 10 This
in turn triggers the Act's beneficial enforcement provisions, allowing
the lemon owner to recover attorneys' fees from the manufacturer. 10 9
A third group of courts, apparently attempting to implement the
Act's policy of holding warrantors directly responsible for their repre-
sentations, 110 have struggled to find a principled means of allowing a
lemon owner to recover a refund as well as attorneys' fees from the
does not become a cowarrantor. Id § 2307. Thus, the Act insulates from liability automobile
dealers who do not offer their own independent warranties. See supra notes 79 & 102 and accom-
panying text. Cf FTC SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 3, at 46 (automobile dealers have not made
independent written warranties since passage of the Act).
104. See supra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
105. These courts generally find that the warranty terms comply with the Act's disclosure re-
quirements and prohibitions against disclaimers of implied warranties. They then declare that the
Act's enforcement provisions do not apply in these cases. See, e.g., Hahn v. Ford Motor Co., 434
N.E.2d 943, 953-54 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982); Ford Motor Co. v. Mayes, 575 S.W.2d 480, 483 n.l (Ky.
Ct. App. 1978); Koperski v. Husker Dodge, Inc., 208 Neb. 29, 46, 302 N.W.2d 655, 664 (1981).
106. See, e.g., Gates v. Chrysler Corp., 397 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. App. 1981); Welch v. Fitzgerald-
Hicks Dodge, Inc., 121 N.H. 358, 430 A.2d 144 (1981); Ventura v. Ford Motor Co., 173 N.J. Super.
501, 414 A.2d 611 (1980), af§'d, 180 NJ. Super. 45, 433 A.2d 801 (1981).
107. See supra note 79. See also Appendices A & B (manufacturer will perform warranty
repairs through its authorized dealer).
108. Welch v. Fitzgerald-Hicks Dodge, Inc., 121 N.H. 358, 365, 430 A.2d 144, 149 (1981) (be-
cause plaintiffs' evidence established a prima facie case under the U.C.C., it also established a
prima facie case under the Act and it was error for the trial court to deny plaintiffs attorneys' fees).
Accord Gates v. Chrysler Corp., 397 So. 2d 1187, 1189 (Fla. App. 1981).
109. See supra notes 94-103 and accompanying text. See also supra note 14 and accompany-
ing text. One commentator suggests that plaintiffs should always join a claim for relief under the
Act with a claim for rejection or revocation of acceptance, because it is then possible to recover
attorneys' fees. Oxenham, supra note 13, at 21.
110. See H.R. REP. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 39, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CONG. & AD.
NEWS 7702, 7721 (by allowing warrantor to designate a representative for performing warranty
service legislators did not intend to allow warrantor to relieve himself of direct responsibilities to
consumer).
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manufacturer. I A few of these courts find that the interaction between
the U.C.C. and the Act permits a lemon owner to recover a refund
from the manufacturer upon revocation of acceptance against the
dealer. 1 2 One court has declared that the Act removes vertical privity
barriers in suits brought for breach of warranty,' 1 3 thus allowing a "re-
scission-type" remedy against the manufacturer." 4
While these courts provide remedies for breach of a limited warranty
that the Act's enforcement provisions seemingly exclude, ' 5 they are
commendable for their efforts to carry out the legislative intent under-
lying the Act." 6 Congress sought to provide consumers with an ade-
quate means of seeking redress against suppliers who use written
warranties to induce sales, but then fail to fulfill their terms."' Con-
gress, however, did not include adequate remedies for consumers seek-
111. See, e.g., Champion Ford Sales, Inc. v. Levine, 49 Md. App. 547, 433 A.2d 1218 (1981);
Royal Lincoln-Mercury Sales, Inc. v. Wallace, 415 So. 2d 1024 (Miss. 1982); Ventura v. Ford
Motor Corp., 180 NJ. Super. 45, 433 A.2d 801 (1981). See generally Preist, .supra note 87, at 1348
(courts tend to give greater protection under warranties than warrantors intended to give).
112. See, e.g., Royal Lincoln-Mercury Sales, Inc. v. Wallace, 415 So. 2d 1024 (Miss. 1982). In
Royal the Mississippi Supreme Court held that the manufacturer's repair or replace warranty
merged into the sales agreement. Thus, when the automobile failed to conform to the dealer's
implied warranty of merchantability, the buyer could recover a refund from the manufacturer
upon cancellation of the sales contract with the dealer in an action under the Act. Id at 1028-29.
Cf Champion Ford Sales, Inc. v. Levine, 49 Md. App. 547, 433 A.2d 1218 (1981) (buyer allowed
to recover refund from manufacturer with no discussion of privity problems).
113. "The Act enhances the consumer's position by allowing recovery under a warranty with-
out regard to privity of contract between the consumer and the warrantor. ... Ventura v. Ford
Motor Corp., 180 N.J. Super. 45, 59, 433 A.2d 801, 811 (1981).
114. "If we focus on the fact that the warranty creates a direct contractual obligation to the
buyer, the reason for allowing the same remedy that is available against a direct seller becomes
clear." Id at 65,433 A.2d at 812. Cf. Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349 (Minn.
1977) (reliance on similar policy reasons to abandon vertical privity ban under U.C.C.)
Other courts have taken the route sometimes followed prior to the Act's enactment of awarding
the defective vehicle's purchase price as damages for a manufacturer's breach of an express war-
ranty. Eg., Riley v. Ford Motor Co., 442 F.2d 670, 674 (5th Cir. 1971). Under the Act, this tactic
enables the plaintiff to collect attorneys' fees as part of the damages. See, e.g., Schrimpf v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., No. 81-921 (Wis. Ct. App. March 10, 1982).
115. While the Act creates a set of remedies, including a "lemon provision," for breach of a
full warranty, 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(4) (1982), it does not do so for limited warranties. See supra
notes 95-97 and accompanying text. Thus, construing the Act's enforcement provisions to allow
the same remedies for breach of a limited warranty as for breach of a full warranty seems to
vitiate the Act's full/limited warranty dichotomy. See supra notes 90, 92, 95 & 96.
116. See supra note 110; infra note 117 and accompanying text.
117. See H.R. REP. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 22-29, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CONG. & AD.
NEws 7702, 7705-11. See also id at I (purpose of the Act was to make warranty terms more
understandable and enforceable).
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ing a refund for a defective product covered by a limited warranty.' 18
III. LEMON LAWS
Legislatures passing lemon laws 19 sought to simplify an owner's
case for recovery, 21 thereby giving the owner greater bargaining power
118. See supra notes 95-115 and accompanying text. See also Pertschuk, supra note 7, at 148-
49 (outlining inadequacies of remedies available to lemon owners under the Act).
119. Appendix C sets out the text of the Connecticut lemon law. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-179
(1983). The California lemon law is very similar to the Connecticut statute. Compare CAL. Civ.
CODE § 1793.2 (Deering Supp. 1983) with CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-179 (1983). Subsequently en-
acted lemon laws are modeled on Connecticut's. Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-179 (1983)
with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 5001-5009 (Supp. 1984) and Act of June 3, 1983, ch. 83-69, 1983
Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 517 (West) (to be codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 681.10-.108 (West)) and ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1161-1165 (Supp. 1983-1984) and Act of Oct. 3, 1983, ch. 395, 1983
Mass. Adv. Legis. Serv. 41 (Law. Co-op.) (to be codified at MASS GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 7N
(West)) and MINN. STAT. § 325F.665 (1984) and MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-4-501 to -505 (1983) and
NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 60-2702 to -2709 (Supp. 1983) and Act of May 10, 1983, ch. 261, 1983 Nev.
Stat. 610 (to be codified at NEv. REV. STAT. § 598) and N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 357-D (Supp.
1984) and Act of June 20, 1983, ch. 215, 1983 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 1026 (West) (to be codified at
N.J. REV. STAT. § 56:12-19 to -28 and N.Y. GEN. Bus LAW § 198-a (McKinney Supp. 1983) and
Act of June 14, 1983, ch. 469, 1983 Or. Laws Adv. Sh. No. 8, 176 and TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 4413 (36) (Vernon Supp. 1984) and Act of May 17, 1983, ch. 240, 1983 Wash. Legis. Serv. 2472
(West) and Act of Oct. 26, 1983, Act 48, 1983, Act 48, 1983 Wis. Legis. Serv. 790 (West) (to be
codified at Wis. STAT. ANN. § 218.015 (West)) and Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 40-17-101 (Supp. 1983).
Appendix D displays the extent to which other have states have followed Connecticut's example.
While there is practically no legislative history yet available on lemon laws passed in 1983, the
Connecticut legislature kept records of its consideration of the nation's first lemon law. Also,
documents are available from California to show the considerations that motivated passage of its
lemon law. Given the similarity among lemon laws and the timing of their passage, it is reason-
able to impute similar legislative goals to all legislatures passing lemon laws. See 2A C. SANDS,
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 52.03 (4th ed. 1973) ("IT]he phraseology and lan-
guage of similar legislation in other jurisdictions is deserving of special consideration not only in
the interests of uniformity, but also for determining the general policy and objectives of a particu-
lar course of legislation."). Thus, the best guides currently available for interpreting lemon laws
are the committee hearings and floor debates published by California and Connecticut. See gener-
all;, id § 52.01.
The United States House of Representatives was first to consider an automobile lemon law. See
H.R. 1005, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979). This bill would have amended the Magnuson-Moss War-
ranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1982), to make its remedies for breach of a full warranty
applicable to all new automobile warranties. Although the bill died in committee, it was subject to
extensive hearings before the Subcommittee on Consumer Protection and Finance. Automobile
Warranty and Repair Act Hearings, supra note 1.
120. See S. Tanner, Statement to the California Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on A.B. 1787
5 (1982) ("ITmhe clear standard proposed in this bill would offer a more effective remedy to the
consumer. . .. ") (on file at Washington University Law Quarterly) [hereinafter cited as Statement
of S. Tanner]; Hearings on House Bil15729 Before the Connecticut Genera/Law Comm. 235 (March
11, 1982) ("[The bill would] release the consumer from the legal burdens and difficulties that exist
when one brings suit under our present law.") (remarks of Rep. Woodcock, bill sponsor) (on file
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against a dealer or manufacturer who refuses to honor warranty obliga-
tions. 121 They also sought to create a system of recovery that would
counter automobile manufacturers' and dealers' reluctance to perform
warranty service on new automobiles. 22 To achieve the goals estab-
at Washington University Law Quarterly) [hereinafter cited as Connecticut General Law Comm.
Hearings].
Lemon laws create a new cause of action for automobile purchasers that eliminates several of
the barriers to recovery found in the U.C.C. Connecticut GeneralLaw Comm. Hearings, supra, at
232-36 (statement of Rep. Woodcock, bill sponsor); Connecticut House Debates, supra note 10, at
3161-62 (remarks of Rep. Woodcock, bill sponsor); R. Elbrecht, The California New Car Lemon
Law 8 (Oct. 25, 1982) (on file at Washington Universitp Law Quarterly). Like the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act, however, lemon laws do not supplant remedies available to automobile purchasers
under other state and federal laws. Eg., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1162(1) (Supp. 1983-
1984)) ("Nothing in this chapter in any way limits the rights or remedies which are otherwise
available to a consumer under any other law."). See Appendix D.
Thus, lemon laws create yet another layer of warranty law applicable to automobile warranties.
Consumers in California, Minnesota and Oregon face a complex body of law because those states
have general consumer warranty statutes, in addition to the U.C.C. and lemon laws specifically
applicable to automobiles. See statues cited supra note 20. See generally Comment, Consumer
Warranty Law in California Under the Commercial Code and the Song-Beverly and Magnuson-
Moss Warranty Acts, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 583 (1979).
The situation is slightly simpler in states that have no general consumer warranty law. There is,
however, the same "layering" of warranty laws. For an overview of the interaction between the
U.C.C. and the Magnuson-Moss Act, see generally Clark, Lemon Aidfor the Consumer: The Inter-
action of Warranty Law Under Article 2 of the U C. C., Magnuson-Moss, and the FTC Holder in
Due Course Rule, reprinted in I PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE CONSUMER CREDIT 11 (1978);
Schroeder, Private Actions Under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 66 CALIF. L. REV. I (1978);
Note, Consumer Product Warranties Under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and the Uniform
Commercial Code, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 738 (1977).
Appendix D demonstrates that there are several elements common to all lemon laws, despite
local variations. First, they extend the manufacturer's repair obligations beyond the time limit set
by the warranty if repairs during the warranty period fail to conform an automobile to the terms
of the warranty. Second, they give automobile purchasers the remedies of refund or replacement
of the defective automobile when a reasonable number of attempts at repair have failed. Third,
they specify what constitutes a presumptively reasonable number of attempts at repair. Fourth,
they allow consumers to recover directly against the manufacturer. Fifth, they apply only if the
manufacturer offers an express warranty. Finally, they state that their remedies are nonexclusive.
121. See Statement of S. Tanner, supra note 120, at 5 ("[Clurrent law does not protect con-
sumers who purchase defective automobiles, because dealers and manufacturers never admit...
that they have a 'reasonable number' of attempts to repair it .... "); Connecticut House Debates,
supra note 10, at 3161 ("The rationale behind the lemon bill has been to improve and enhance the
responsiveness an [sic] accountability of automobile manufacturer [sic] to consumer complaints
with defective new cars [sic].").
122. See Statement of S. Tanner, supra note 120, at 5 ("[The bill] would encourage improved
quality control by manufacturers and improved repair service by dealers."); Connecticut General
Law Committee Hearings, supra note 120, at 236 ("[lIt will provide a clear standard, which will
give consumers an effective, reasonable and meaningful remedy, which will in turn, ultimately
reduce costs and delays in lengthy litigation.") (remarks of Rep. Woodcock, bill sponsor). See also
Connecticut House Debates, supra note 10, at 3154 ("[lit will help the dealer to press the manufac-
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lished by the legislatures, courts interpreting lemon laws must refer to
the policies underlying these statutes rather than relying on settled in-
terpretations of similar statutory language in the U.C.C..123
A. Policy Goals
The law of products liability 124 generally has confined consumers
who have suffered only economic loss 125 to recovery based on breach of
warranty.' 26  The U.C.C. and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act,
turer for consideration of this car being exchanged or for work being done.") (remarks of Rep.
Zajac, committee member); supra note 10.
123. See infra notes 147-79 and accompanying text. Lemon laws illustrate an instance in
which individual states sought to provide protection for consumers beyond that afforded by the
"neutral" U.C.C.. See supra note 20.
As of the time of publication, there are no reported cases interpreting lemon laws, although
cases have been filed in New York and Connecticut. Telephone interview with Evan Johnston,
Assistant Director of the Center for Auto Safety (January 23, 1984) (the Center for Auto Safety
compiles reports on all automobile warranty litigation based on notification from attorneys). The
one year period during which the repair attempts must occur helps explain this lag. Because
Connecticut's statute only became effective Oct. 1, 1982, legislators did not expect that consumers
would begin bringing cases before Oct. 1, 1983. See Connecticut House Debates, supra note 10, at
3172 (remarks of Rep. Woodcock, bill sponsor).
124. Commentators generally identify negligence, strict liability in tort and warranty as the
theories on which consumers may base a claim for damages caused by a defective product. See 1
R. HURSH & H. BAILY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODuCTS LIABILITY 2D § 1:3 (2d ed. 1974). Each of
these theories limits the types of recovery allowed, the parties who may be held liable, and the
prerequisites a consumer must satisfy before bringing suit. See generally W. KIMBLE & R.
LESHER, PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§ 11-22 (1979). Generally, an action based on strict liability in
tort or negligence will have advantages over an action for breach of warranty for a consumer who
suffers physical injury or property damage when a defective product malfunctions. See
Edmeades, The Citadel Stands: The Recovery of Economic Loss in American Products Liability, 27
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 647, 648-49 (1977). Because lemon laws apply only to the economic losses
suffered by the purchaser of a defective automobile, this Note will discuss negligence and strict
liability only insofar as these theories highlight the policies underlying lemon laws.
125. One commentator gives the following description of the types of damages a consumer
might incur.
A successful product liability suit offers an injured individual three potential forms of
recovery: (1) "personal" damages, which compensate for bodily harm; (2) "property"
damages, which compensate for injury to property other than the defective product; and
(3) "economic" damages, of which "direct" compensate for harm to the defective prod-
uct itself and "consequential" for harm to business expectations, such as profits and good
will.
Note, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 118, 118 (1978). For a fuller discussion of the concept of economic
loss, see Edmeades, supra note 124, at 650-52. Lemon laws allow recovery of direct economic loss
because they allow recovery for the damage defects cause to the automobile itself.
126. Note, supra note 125, at 118. The most widely cited case holding that consumers can
recover economic losses only on a breach of warranty theory is Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal.
2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965). The court held that a manufacturer should not incur
liability for any failure of a product to fulfill a consumer's expectations. Therefore, the court
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along with state consumer warranty statutes, determine the applicable
remedies. 27 When defective products cause physical injury or prop-
erty damage, however, courts and legislatures have found that the con-
sumer's interest in recovery is too important to relegate to the
"intricacies of the law of sales."' 28  Courts allowing recovery under
alternative theories of liability have relied principally on the con-
sumer's inability to guard against these losses by bargaining with a
seller for more favorable warranty terms, and the manufacturer's supe-
rior capability for redistributing losses.
129
Similar concerns motivated legislatures passing lemon laws.' 30 They
noted that a defective automobile causes economic losses beyond those
associated with its decreased value' 31 because Americans depend so
heavily on their automobiles for transportation.' 3 2 In addition, legisla-
reasoned, the law should allow manufacturers to limit the risks to which they expose themselves
through the terms of their warranties, if their products cause only economic loss. 63 Cal. 2d at 18,
403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23 (1965). Most state courts have followed Seely. See, e.g., Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 626 F.2d 280, 287 (3d Cir. 1980); Morrow
v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279, 284 (Alaska 1976); Flory v. Silvercrest Indust., Inc., 130
Ariz. App. 15, 19, 633 P.2d 424, 426 (1980); Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326,
334, 581 P.2d 784, 792 (1978); National Crane Corp. v. Ohio Steel Tube Co., 332 N.W.2d 39, 43
(Neb. 1983). Contra I.C.I. Australia Ltd. v. Elliot Overseas Co., 551 F. Supp. 265, 268 (D.N.J.
1982); Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, 44 N.J. 52, 66, 207 A.2d 305, 312 (1965).
127. See supra notes 20, 89 & 120.
128. Dean Prosser used this phrase in his classic article The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1134 (1960). The drafters of the Second Restate-
ment of Torts soon adopted Prossers proposal for a form of strict liability which did not depend
on privity of contract and which operated despite the consumer's failure to give notice of defects
or the manufacturer's disclaimer of warranties. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A
(1965). Courts quickly adopted this solution to their problems with warranties in personal injury
cases. Eg., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697
(1963); Garthwait v. Burgia, 153 Conn. 284, 216 A.2d 189 (1965); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32
Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965); Dealers Transp. Co. v. Battery Distrib. Co., 402 S.W.2d 441
(Ky. 1965); Wights v. Staff Jennings, Inc., 241 Or. 301, 405 P.2d 624 (1965). Some states have
codified § 402A. E.g., S.C. CODE § 15-73-10 (1977).
129. E.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 463-68, 150 P.2d 436, 441-44
(1944) (Traynor, J., concurring); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 379-84, 161
A.2d 69, 80-84 (1960).
130. See Connecticut House Debates, supra note 10, at 101-02 (consumer can only look to
manufacturer to perform in accordance with the terms of warranty); Hearings on HB. 18 Before
the Montana Business andIndustry Comm. 1 (Jan. 19, 1983) (warranties are totally voluntary state-
ments by the manufacturer on his product) (remarks of Brinton Markel, Montana Dept. of Com-
merce) (on file at Washington University Law Quarterly).
131. See Connecticut House Debates, supra note 10, at 3126-35 (remarks of Rep. Woodcock,
bill sponsor).
132. Cf. Calfornia Automobile Hearings, supra note 120, at 234 (statement of Rep. Woodcock)
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tures considered evidence that the interaction of the laws governing
warranties and the structure of the automobile sales industry encour-
ages dealers and manufacturers to avoid making warranty repairs.
133
Lemon laws, therefore, represent a legislative judgment that a con-
sumer's interest in a dependable automobile backed by an enforceable
warranty is too important to relegate to the "intricacies of the law of
sales." 13 4
Lemon laws directly address the problems consumers face when they
seek to enforce warranties on new automobiles.' 35 They are founded
on a recognition that consumers have no power to alter the terms of a
manufacturer's warranty 36 and, therefore, impose performance obliga-
tions which exceed those a manufacturer voluntarily assumes in the
standard automobile warranty.'37 Legislatures did not intend, how-
ever, to force manufacturers to provide replacements or refunds for
automobiles having only minor defects or defects not covered by the
(most onerous burden for consumers deciding to litigate is ceasing use of automobile during pen-
dency of dispute).
133. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Finance of the House Comm.
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 199-201 (1979) (statement of Albert H.
Kramer, Director of Bureau of Consumer Protection of the Federal Trade Commission), excerpted
in California Automobile Hearings, supra note 10, at 338; Connecticut General Law Committee
Hearings, supra note 120, at 283-84 (remarks of Leonard Bornstein).
134. Cf. Connecticut General Law Committee Hearings, supra note 10, at 234-35 (remarks of
Rep. Woodcock, bill sponsor) (outlining the need for lemon laws in light of consumers' difficulties
in recovering under the U.C.C. and the Magnuson-Moss Act).
135. See, e.g., Act of June 3, 1983, ch. 83-69, § 2, 1983 Fla. Sess. Law. Serv. 517, 518 (West) (to
be codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 681.101 (West)) ("It is . . . the intent of the Legislature to
provide the statutory procedures whereby a consumer may receive a replacement motor vehicle,
or a full refund, for a motor vehicle which cannot be brought into conformity with the express
warranty issued by the manufacturer."); MIN. STAT. § 325F.665 (1984) ("An Act.. . requiring
the repair, refund, or replacement of new motor vehicles under certain circumstances."); Act of
May 10, 1983, ch. 261, 1983 Nev. Stat. 610, 610 (to be codified at NEv. REv. STAT. § 598) ("An Act
relating to motor vehicles; requiring manufacturers, their agents or their authorized dealers under
specified circumstances to make repairs necessary to conform certain motor vehicles to the express
warranties covering them.").
136. See Connecticut House Debates, supra note 10, at 3122-33 (remarks of Rep. Woodcock,
bill sponsor) ("[Tlhe consumer cannot look to the manufacturer for any other relief, other than
repairs as spelled out in the vehicle warrantee [sic].").
137. Eg., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1163(1) (Supp. 1983-84)) ("[T~he manufacturer, its
agent or its authorized dealer shall make those repairs necessary to conform the vehicle to the
express warranties, notwithstanding the fact that the repairs are made after the expiration of [the
warranty] term or [a] one year period [after delivery]."). See Appendix D (notes which statutes
impose similar obligations on automobile manufacturers).
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manufacturer's warranty.138  These statutes allow recovery only when
an unrepaired defect seriously undermines the automobile's use or
value. 39 They also allow manufacturers to avoid liability by selling an
automobile "as is.' 140
Legislators sought to use a manufacturer's capability for redistrib-
uting losses on a broad scale to benefit all automobile purchasers.141
By allowing lemon owners to demand a refund or a replacement vehi-
cle from manufacturers after a clearly defined number of unsuccessful
repair attempts, 42 the legislatures sought to encourage manufacturers
to create incentives for dealers to offer better warranty service to auto-
mobile purchasers. 43
Legislators were aware that manufacturers would pass the cost of
replacing lemons on to automobile purchasers in the form of higher
prices. 144 Consumers, therefore, will pay the premiums for the insur-
ance that lemon laws give individual purchasers against losses attribu-
table to a defective automobile.145  Consequently, lemon laws allow
138. See Connecticut General Law Committee Hearings, supra note 120, at 268 (remarks of
Rep. Atkins, committee member).
139. Almost all lemon laws require that the defect "substantially impair" the automobile's use,
value or safety. E.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 61-4-503(1) (1983) ("If after a reasonable number of
attempts the manufacturer or its agent or authorized dealer is unable, during the warranty period,
to conform the new motor vehicle to any applicable express warranty by repairing or correcting
any defect or condition that substantially impairs the use and market value or safety of the motor
vehicle to the consumer. ... ) (emphasis added). See infra notes 164-66.
140. Statement of S. Tanner, supra note 120, at 4 ("If the vehicle was sold 'as is' .. the bill
would not apply."). See Appendix D.
141. See infra note 145 and accompanying text. Cf Connecticut House Debates, supra note 10,
at 3161 (remarks of Rep. Woodcock) ("The rationale behind the lemon bill has been to improve
and enhance the responsiveness an [sic] accountability of automobile manufacturer [sic] to con-
sumer complaints with defective new cars [sic].").
142. Compare cases cited supra note 23 (under the U.C.C. lemon owners must allow many
repair attempts before seeking relief) with statutes cited infra note 148 (setting out the number of
repair attempts an owner must allow before seeking relief under a lemon law).
143. See Connecticut House Debates, supra note 10, at 3154 (remarks of Rep. Zajac, bill co-
sponsor) ("[Clertainly on that third time, going in for the fourth, the manufacturer knowing that
this be [sic] the case, will definitely say to the dealer, at all prices replace that transmission or make
good on it before it has to come back. . . . [I]t will force the manufacturer to give the dealer the
authority to, in fact, repair it and make it shipshape and put it back on the road."). Even if
manufacturers can pass on to consumers the costs which they will incur due to recovery by con-
sumers under lemon laws, see infra note 144 and accompanying text, manufacturers will eventu-
ally suffer some losses in the form of reduced demand for higher priced automobiles.
144. Cf. Connecticut General Law Committee Hearings, supra note 120, at 267 (statement of
Eugene Wagner on behalf of the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association) (stating that consum-
ers must pay the price for increased warranty protection).
145. "By shifting the lemon penalty from the unlucky few consumers to the manufacturer,
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purchasers to recover a refund or a replacement only if an automobile
is seriously defective.146
B. Judicial Interpretation
Most lemon laws create a rebuttable presumption 47 that four at-
tempts to repair a single defect, or a total of thirty days out of service
due to repairs during the first year after delivery, constitutes a reason-
able number of attempts to make a new motor vehicle conform to ap-
plicable warranties. 148  This presumption roughly parallels a showing
under the U.C.C. that an exclusive remedy has failed of its essential
purpose. 149 These statutes differ from the U.C.C. in that they allow
lemon owners to demand relief without fear that a court will find that
there is largely a transfer of risk; that is, the risk of getting a lemon is shared by all buyers, and not
just imposed on the unlucky ones." Automobile Warranty and Repair Act Hearings, supra note 1,
at 154 (statement of Michael Pertschuk, Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission).
146. See supra note 139.
147. After a consumer establishes the requisite number of unsuccessful repair attempts, the
fact-finder must presume the manufacturer has made a reasonable number of attempts to repair
the automobile. See infra notes 148-49 and accompanying text. In many states, the manufacturer
then bears the burden of proving that the nonexistence of this presumed fact is more likely than its
existence. Eg., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1793.2(e)(1) (Deering Supp. 1983); CAL. EVID. CODE § 606
(Deering 1966); Act of June 3, 1983, ch. 83-69, § 5(4), 1983 Fla. Sess. Law. Serv. 517, 521 (West)
(to be codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 681.104(4) (West); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.304 (West 1979);
Act of May 10, 1983, ch. 261 § 4(2), 1983 Nev. Stat. 610, 611 (to be codified at NEv. REV. STAT.
§ 598(4)(2)); NEV. REV. STAT. § 47.180(1) (1979); Act of June 14, 1983, ch. 469, § 4, 1983 Or. Laws
Adv. Sh. No. 8, 176, 177; OR. REV. STAT. § 40.120 Rule 308 (1981). In other states, the presump-
tion in favor of the consumer exists only until the manufacturer produces some evidence to dis-
prove the fact presumed, whereupon the burden of proving the existence of the presumed fact
returns to the consumer. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 325F.665 (1984); Act of June 20, 1983, ch. 215, § 4,
1983 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 1026, 1028 (West) (to be codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:12-22 (West));
N.J. R. EVID. 13, 14. MINN. R. EVID. 301.
148. Eg.. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4413 (36) § 6.07(d) (Vernon Supp. 1984) ("It shall
be presumed that a reasonable number of attempts have been undertaken to conform a motor
vehicle to the applicable express warranties if (1) the same nonconformity has been subject to
repair four or more times ... within the express warranty term or during the period of one year
following the date of original delivery of an owner, whichever is the earlier date, but such noncon-
formity continues to exist; or (2) the vehicle is out of service for repairs for a cumulative total of 30
or more days during such term or during such period, whichever is the earlier date."). See Appen-
dices C & D. Some lemon laws establish different standards for what constitutes a reasonable
number of attempts at repair. Act of June 3, 1983, ch. 83-69 § 5(4), 1983 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 517,
521 (West) (to be codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 681.104(4) (West) (3 repair attempts or 15 work-
ing days); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 198-a(d) (McKinney Supp. 1983)) (time period during which the
4 attempts or 30 days must occur extended to two years or 18,000 miles, whichever comes first).
149. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text. Compare U.C.C. § 2-719(2) (1978) (when
circumstances cause an exclusive remedy to fail of its essential purpose all remedies provided by
the U.C.C. become available) with CAL. CIV. CODE § 1793.2(d) (Deering 1981) (when a reason-
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slow and ineffective warranty service did not deprive the buyer of the
benefit of his bargain. 5 °
Once the buyer establishes the required number of unsuccessful re-
pair attempts, 15' the burden of proof 52 shifts to the manufacturer 53 to
establish that, under the circumstances, the buyer reasonably should
have allowed a greater number of attempts at repair.' 54 A substantial
number of statutory mechanisms designed to improve the buyer's abil-
ity to secure effective warranty service depend on this presumption. 1
55
Thus, legislative goals are best served if courts instruct juries that only
exceptional circumstances can excuse failure to perform within the time
allowed.' 56 For instance, if a dealer's failure to perform results from an
inability to diagnose the problem, or unexplainably slow deliveries of
parts, courts faithful to the policies underlying lemon laws will not re-
lieve the manufacturer of statutory liability. Delays of this order are
components of the ineffective warranty service the legislatures sought
to eliminate. 157 If delays result from supervening causes, 58 however,
such as unavoidable equipment failures or personnel shortages, these
statutes provide an excuse to the extent that these conditions interfered
with the dealer's or manufacturer's timely performance of repairs.
able number of attempts to conform an item to its express warranty fail, buyer becomes entitled to
a refund or a replacement).
150. The need to assure a buyer an adequate remedy which preserves the benefit of the bar-
gain underlies the buyer's ability under the U.C.C. to avoid the exclusive remedy set out in the
manufacturer's warranty. See supra note 24. Buyers seldom know how long they must allow the
dealer to attempt repairs under the U.C.C., since it is difficult to gauge when failure to remedy a
breach of warranty will deprive the buyer of the benefit of his bargain. See supra note 23. Lemon
laws set out a numerical standard for a reasonable number of attempts which a manufacturer can
overcome only by a showing that efforts were reasonable under the circumstances. See infra note
154 and accompanying text.
151. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 147.
154. See Statement of S. Tanner, supra note 120, at 4 ("The presumption could be overcome
by a showing on the part of the warrantor that 4 attempts or 30 days were not reasonable in that
particular case.").
155. See supra notes 141-46 and accompanying text.
156. Most lemon laws explicitly provide for extension of the warranty period and the 30 day
period for causes that are clearly beyond the dealer's or manufacturer's control. E.g., N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 357-D:6 (Supp. 1984) ("war, invasion, strike or fire, flood or other natural
disaster.").
157. Cf. Connecticut House Debates, supra note 10, at 3179-81 (remarks of Rep. Woodcock,
bill sponsor) (outlining the consequences of a dealer's failure to schedule repair attempts).
158. Cf. supra note 156 (setting out lemon law provision which extends warranty period for
specified reasons).
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To invoke the statutory presumption, a buyer must show that the
manufacturer's warranty covers the claimed defects. 159 The lemon
owner's ability to recover under these statutes, therefore, will often de-
pend on whether the court requires direct evidence that the malfunc-
tion resulted from a defect in material or workmanship. 160 In
balancing the interests of lemon owners and manufacturers, legislatures
allowed manufacturers to limit their exposure to liability by limiting
the coverage of their warranties. 161  To fulfill this legislative intent,
courts must require lemon owners to introduce at least circumstantial
evidence of the defect's origin by demonstrating an absence of other
causes.162 To this extent, courts should not instruct juries to infer that a
warranted defect exists from the mere fact that an automobile malfunc-
tioned during the warranty period.' 63
The statutory language indicates that a buyer seeking recovery must
show that the warranted defect substantially impairs the automobile. 164
Some statutes preserve the subjective elements of the test laid down by
the U.C.C., requiring that the nonconformity "substantially impair[s]
159. Almost all lemon laws operate only when an automobile fails to conform to a manufac-
turer's express warranty. E.g., Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 40-17-101 (Supp. 1983). See Appendix D. But
see N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 357-D (Supp. 1984) (operates when a manufacturer fails to conform
a new automobile to any applicable implied warranties).
160. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
161. Cf. Statement of S. Tanner, supra note 120, at 4 ("[T]his bill would apply only to those
vehicles or parts of vehicles covered by the manufacturer's warranty.").
162. Cf. Connecticut General Law Committee Hearings, supra note 120, at 271 (statement of
Joseph Nedrow, Regional Manager for General Motors Corporation) (outlining the difficulties in
determining that a defect resulted from faulty material or workmanship).
163. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text. Many lemon laws state that the manufac-
turer may establish as an affirmative defense that the automobile's defects do not substantially
impair its use, value, or safety. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-179(i)(c)(I) (1983); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10, § 1164(1) (Supp. 1983-84); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 357-D:5(I) (Supp. 1984); Act of
June 20, 1983, ch. 215, § 6, 1983 NJ. Sess. Law Serv. 1026, 1029 (West) (to be codified at N.J.
REv. STAT. § 56:12-24); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 198-a(c)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1983); Act of June
14, 1983, ch. 469 § 3(3)(a), 1983 Or. Laws Adv. Sh. No. 8, 176, 177; TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN.
art. 4413 (36) § 6.07(c)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1984); WVyo. STAT. ANN. § 40-17-101(g)(1) (Supp. 1983).
Nonetheless, it seems that the consumer should bear at least the burden of pleading that the
automobile is a lemon, because the facts which would prove the magnitude of the defect are
uniquely within the owner's knowledge. See 9 J. WIGMORE, WIGMOPE ON EVIDENCE § 2486
(Chadbourn rev. ed. 1981); F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.8 (2d ed. 1977). See
also C. McCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 337, at 786 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972)
("The burdens of pleading and proof with regard to most facts have been and should be assigned
to the plaintiff who generally seeks to change the present state of affairs and who therefore natu-
rally should be expected to bear the risk of failure of proof or persuasion.").
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the use and value of the motor vehicle to the consumer." '165 Other stat-
utes, however, appear to establish a purely objective standard, allowing
a refund only if the defect "substantially impairs the use, value, or
safety of the new motor vehicle." 166 Whether an objective or subjective
standard applies, the statutory language provides little guidance for de-
termining the types of defects that entitle an automobile purchaser to a
refund. 167
Legislatures intended to protect manufacturers from unjustified de-
mands for refunds or replacement vehicles by specifying standards for
the types of defects which warrant cancellation of a contract of sale. 168
To effectuate these goals courts must develop coherent standards for
measuring the degree to which a defect impairs an automobile. 169 If
courts construe this language to allow recovery solely because an auto-
mobile's defects shake the buyer's faith in its dependability, 170 these
laws will operate to impose losses on manufacturers and consumers
that they were not intended to bear. On the other hand, allowing re-
covery only if a defect diminishes the automobile's value to a certain
percentage of its purchase price17 ' will undermine the legislative goal
of increasing lemon owners' bargaining power in warranty disputes. 172
Consumers can rarely evaluate an automobile's diminished value in
terms of dollars, so that they seldom know when they stand securely
165. E.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 42-179(c) (1983) ("a defect or condition which substantially
impairs the use and value of the motor vehicle to the consumer."). See Appendix D.
166. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1793.2(e)(4)(A) (Deering Supp. 1983) ("nonconformity which
substantially impairs the use, value, or safety of the new motor vehicle."). See Appendix D. Flor-
ida's statute is unique in that it requires only that the defect "impairs the use, market value, or
safety of the motor vehicle to the consumer." Act of June 3, 1983, ch. 83-69 § 5(1), 1983 Fla. Sess.
Law Serv. 517, 520 (West) (to be codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 681.104(1) (West).
167. For a discussion of judicial inability to establish precisely what constitutes substantial
impairment of an automobile under the U.C.C., see supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
168. See Connecticut House Debates, supra note 10, at 3118 (remarks of Rep. Woodcock, bill
sponsor) (although Rep. Woodcock did not want to jeopardize automobile manufacturers' eco-
nomic situation, he introduced the Connecticut Lemon Law to protect those few people who end
up with a lemon automobile).
169. See Connecticut House Debates, supra note 10, at 3154-55 (remarks of Rep. Zajac, bill co-
sponsor) (question of how improved warranty service will come about under the Connecticut
Lemon Law cannot be resolved until judges determine what "substantial" means in each case).
170. For a discussion of the "shaken faith" doctrine, see supra note 40 and accompanying text.
171. For cases brought under the U.C.C. in which courts used this measure, see supra note 59.
172. See Connecticut General Law Committee Hearings, supra note 120, at 236 (statement of
Rep. Woodcock, bill sponsor) ("[T]he bill ... will strengthen the position of a Connecticut new
car buyer who is forced to play the game when a manufacturer or its agents refuse to acknowledge
the defects or in the alternative, request endless opportunities to repair those defects.").
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within their rights in demanding a refund or a replacement vehicle.
The standard that courts adopt, therefore, must comport with automo-
bile purchasers' reasonable expectations for an automobile's
performance.
Most lemon laws state that a defect must impair the automobile's use
and value.173 Courts can focus on this language to allow recovery only
when the dealer's repair efforts have failed to produce a safe and de-
pendable vehicle. In states adopting a subjective standard, 74 the fact-
finder should also consider evidence of a buyer's particular needs to
determine whether an automobile's defects prevent it from fulfilling
that buyer's requirements.175
In addition to clarifying the legal standards for recovery under
lemon laws, judicial interpretation of these statutes can decrease the
lemon owner's practical difficulties in bringing suit by allowing contin-
ued use of the automobile during the pendency of a warranty dis-
pute. 76  Presently, only two lemon laws incorporate provisions for
continued use after the buyer demands a refund. 177 No statute requires
that the consumer surrender the automobile or cease using it after pro-
viding notice of its nonconformities. Because these laws do not rely on
173. Eg., CAL. Cry. CODE § 1793.2(e)(4)(A) (Deering Supp. 1983) ("use, value, or safety");
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-179(1)(c) (1983) ("use and value"); Act of June 3, 1983, ch. 85-69, § 5(l),
1983 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 517, 520 (West) (to be codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 681.104(1) (West)
("use, market value, or safety"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 1163(2) (Supp. 1983-1984) ("use
and value"); MINN. STAT. § 325F.665(1)(3)(a) (1984) ("use or market value"); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 61-4-503(1) (1983) ("use and market value or safety"); Act of May 10, 1983, ch. 261, § 4(l), 1983
Nev. Stat. 610, 611 (to be codified at NEV. REV. STAT. § 598(4)(1) ("use and value"); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 357-D:3(I) (Supp. 1984) ("use and value"); Act of June 20, 1983, ch. 215, § l(f), 1983
N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 1026, 1027 (West) (to be codified at N.J. REv. STAT. § 56:12-19(0) ("use,
value or safety"); Act of June 14, 1983, ch. 469, § 3(1), 1983 Or. Laws Adv. Sh. No. 8, 176, 176
("use and market value"); TEx. REV. Cwy. STAT. ANN. art. 4413(36) § 6.07(c) (Vernon Supp. 1984)
("use and market value"); Act of May 17, 1983, ch. 240, § 2(2), 1983 Wash. Legis. Serv. 2472, 2473
(West) ("use, value, or safety"); WVyo. STAT. ANN. § 40-17-101(c) (Supp. 1983) ("use and fair
market value"). But see N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 198-a(c) (McKinney Supp. 1984), ("any defect or
condition which substantially impairs the value of the motor vehicle to the consumer").
174. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
175. Cf Asciolla v. Manter Oldsmobile-Pontiac, Inc., 117 N.H. 85, 88-89, 370 A.2d 270, 273
(1977) (requiring such considerations under the U.C.C.).
176. For a discussion of these difficulties see supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
Legislators considering lemon laws were aware of this problem. See Connecticut General Law
Committee Hearings, supra note 10, at 234 (statement of Rep. Woodcock, bill sponsor).
177. Act of Oct. 3, 1983, ch. 395, § 1(6), 1983 Mass. Adv. Legis. Serv. 41, 43 (Law. Co-op) (to
be codified at MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 7N (6) (West); Act of Oct. 26, 1983, Act 48,
§ 1(2)(c), 1983 Wis. Legis. Serv. 790,791 (West) (to be codified at Wis. STAT. ANN. § 218.015(2)(c)
(West).
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the U.C.C.'s scheme of rejection, acceptance and revocation of accept-
ance, 78 it would be improper for courts to construe these statutes to
impose similar obligations on a consumer who demands a refund or a
replacement automobile.
IV. CONCLUSION
Legislatures had expansive goals for lemon laws. In creating a new
remedy for lemon owners they sought to alleviate many systemic ills
that have plagued the automobile sales industry. The statutes they en-
acted, however, may prove inadequate to achieve those goals because
lemon laws incorporate terms and concepts that courts heretofore have
interpreted within the U.C.C.'s framework of rejection, acceptance and
revocation of acceptance.'79
Decisions interpreting the U.C.C. have produced inconsistent stan-
dards for determining whether a warranted defect exists, whether it
substantially impairs the value of an automobile and whether the
lemon owner's actions will defeat recovery. Courts can avoid inconsis-
tent results in factually similar cases if they consciously attempt to im-
plement legislative goals when construing these statutes. Fulfilling
legislative goals for increasing a lemon owner's bargaining power in
warranty disputes and equitably redistributing economic losses re-
quires courts to establish coherent standards. Without such standards
lemon laws may ease the lemon owner's route to recovery in particular
cases, but will not achieve the legislatures' larger goals for reforming
the automobile warranty system.
Elizabeth E. Vollmar
178. Lemon laws merge the U.C.C.'s remedies of rejection and revocation of acceptance into a
single standard that relies on the reasonableness of the repair attempts the consumer allows.
Thus, the issues in litigation under lemon laws should not revolve around whether the owner
accepted the automobile. For a discussion of the effect of acceptance in cases governed by the
U.C.C., see supra notes 33-49 and accompanying text.
179. Compare U.C.C. § 2-608 (1978) ("The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot or com-
mercial unit whose non-conformity substantially impairs its value to him.") with ME. Rnv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10, § 1163(2) (Supp. 1983-84) (if the manufacturer fails to correct a defect which substan-
tially impairs the use and value of the motor vehicle, the manufacturer shall give the consumer a
refund or a replacement vehicle).
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APPENDIX A
1984 AMC FULL 12-MONTH/1 2,000-MILE WARRANTY
1. Warranty Coverage Duration: A Strong Warranty
American Motors Corporation* warrants to the original purchaser and each subsequent
owner of an AMC vehicle that the vehicle (including any replacement parts provided under
this warranty) is free from defects in material and workmanship under normal use and service
for the earlier of 12 months or 12,000 miles (20 000 km)* from the date of delivery or first
use of the vehicle, whichever comes first.
If the vehicle becomes defective under normal use and service, any authorized AMC Dealer in the
United States or Canada will, without charge and at the Dealer's place of business within a
reasonable time after delivery of the vehicle to the Dealer, repair or, at AMC's option, replace with
a new or Factory reconditioned part, any part found defective.
Except for other written warranties issued by AMC applicable to new AMC vehicles or parts, no
other express warranty is given or authorized by AMC. AMC disclaims any implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS for any period beyond the express warranty. No authorized AMC
Dealer has authority to change or modify this warranty in any respect. EXCEPT AS MAY BE PRO-
VIDED BELOW, AMC SHALL NOT BE LIABLE FOR LOSS OF USE OF VEHICLE, LOSS OF TIME, IN-
CONVENIENCE, TOWING, RENTAL OR SUBSTITUTE TRANSPORTATION, LODGING, LOSS OF
BUSINESS OR ANY OTHER INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES. SOME STATES AND
PROVINCES DO NOT ALLOW THE EXCLUSION OR LIMITATION OF INCIDENTAL OR CONSE-
QUENTIAL DAMAGES, SO THE ABOVE EXCLUSION MAY NOT APPLY TO YOU. This warranty
gives you specific legal rights and you may also have other rights which vary from state to state or
province to province.
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APPENDIX B
CHRYSLER CORPORATION'S X 1984 POWERTRAIN
BASIC 12 MONTHI12,000 MILE J194PWR AIE TY LIMITED WARRANTY4 NEW VEHICLE LIMITED WARRANT
WHAT IS COVERED
WARRANTY BEGINS
This warranty begins on the date of original
retail delivery or original use, whichever
Dccurs first(
fBASIC COVERAGE
The basic warranty is 12 months or 12.00D
miles. whichever occurs first
WARRANTY APPLIES
This warranty is for Chrysler vehicles
registered and normally operated in the
United States or Canada.
COVERAGE
This warranty covers any repairs to this
vehicle (except tires) which proves de-
fective in material and workmanship in
'normal use
NO CHARGE
Warranty repairs (parts and labor) will be
made by your Selhng Dealer at no charge
using new or remanufactured parts.
k i ADJUSTMENTS
Required adjustments wilt be made by
your Selling Dealer during the irst 3
months of the warranty period (See
Adjustments" paragraph for details )
WHAT IS COVERED
To the First Retail Purchaser only, upon expiration of the 12 monlh/
12.000 mile Basic New Vehicle Limited Warranty. this powertrms
warranty covers components listed below to s years or 50.050 miles
whichever occurs first This powerrain limited warranty is subject to a
SICO deductible for each repair visit
As used. the term First Retail Purchaser means tIhe irst legal
ownership e a vehicle for use and not for resale
To all subsequent purchasers and vehicles placed In FIlt. Polie. Text,
Limousine or Jitney service. upon expiration ot the 12 monthI2,000 mile
Basic New Vehicle Limited Warranty, the powerhaln warranty covers
components lIsted below to 24 months or 24.000 miles, whichever
occurs first. This powertroln limited warranty Is subject to a S100
deductible for each repatr visit.
$ YEARI5O.000 MILE COVERED COMPONENTS
ENGINE - Cylinder block and all internal paris cylinder head assemblies
core plugs, valve covers oil pan timing gear drive bells and'or chains
and cover. vl pump intake and exhaust yanifolds, water pump
turbocharger housings and internal parts and turbochaiget waslegale
actuator Gaskets and seats for listed components
TRANSMISSION - Transmission case and all internal parts gaskets
and seats, oil pan, torque converter with startler ring gear and tIes plate
clutch housing, flywheel
FRONT WHEEL DRIVE - Transaxle case and all internal parts gaskets
and seals. Oil pan and ditferenlial cover, torque converter and drve Plato
with starter ring gear. clutch housing tlywheel, drive shalt assemblies
universal joists, housings and boots
REAR WHEEL DRIVE Drive axle housing and all inlernal parts
gaskets and seals axe shafts axle shall bearings and seals drive shall
assemblies unversal joints and yokes
This warranty covers repairs made necessary due to a detect in material
of workmanship It applies to Chrysler veholes registeted and normally
operated in the 50 Uniled Slates Washington DC and Canada This
warranty does not limit the terms and conditons of other warranties
contained in this booklet
WHAT IS NOT COVERED
This warranty does not cover any item listed under What Is Not
Covered in the Basic New Vehicle Limited Warranty
OWNER'S RESPONSIBILITY
To obtain service under this warranty, take your vehicln to your selling
dealer Your cost tor those repairs coveted under this warranly is limited
to the specified deductibe for each repair visit
THE -OTHER TERMS STATED IN THE BASIC NEW VEHICLE
LIMITED WARRANTY ALSO APPLY TO THIS WARRANTY
OTHER TERMS: This warranty gives you specific legal rights
and you may also have other rights which vary from state to
state
THIS WARRANTY IS THE ONLY EXPRESS WARRANTY MADE
BY CHRYSLER CORPORATION APPLICABLE TO THIS
VEHICLE. ANY IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY
OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE APPLICABLE TO
THIS VEHICLE IS LIMITED IN DURATION TO THE DURATION
OF THIS WRITTEN WARRANTY. CHRYSLER CORPORATION
SHALL NOT BE LIABLE FOR CONSEQUENTIAL OR COM.
MERCIAL DAMAGES RESULTING FROM BREACH OF THIS
WRITTEN WARRANTY.
*Some sters do not allow the exclusion or imtaton of incidental or
aosve enrar arases orimiutio n on hO tong an w ird nyo ryraiss ISC
above iwituvons or evolUSIenS way nlot appiy to you
CUSTOMER SATISFACTION BOARD
In the 50 United States and Washington. D C. it a warranty
dispute has not been resolved to your satisfaction you may
submit the issue to a Chrysler Customer Satisfaction Board The
case must be submitted to the Customer Satisfaction Board
before action under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act can be
taken. However, Ibis dogs not apply for enforcement of state
created rights or other rights which exist Independent from tho
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act
Additional information and the address of each Customer
Satisfaction Board is contained In the Customer Satlisfactlon





(1)(a) As used in this section and section 2 of this act: (1) "Con-
sumer" means the purchaser, other than for purposes of resale, of a
motor vehicle, any person to whom such motor vehicle is transferred
during the duration of an express warranty applicable to such motor
vehicle, and any other person entitled by the terms of such warranty to
enforce the obligations of the warranty; and (2) "motor vehicle" means
a passenger motor vehicle or a passenger and commercial motor vehi-
cle, as defined in subdivisions (35) and (36) of section 14-1, which is
sold in this state.
(b) If a new motor vehicle does not conform to all applicable ex-
press warranties, and the consumer reports the nonconformity to the
manufacturer, its agent or its authorized dealer during the term of such
express warranties or during the period of one year following the date
of original delivery of the motor vehicle to a consumer, whichever is
the earlier date, the manufacturer, its agent or its authorized dealer
shall make such repairs as are necessary to conform the vehicle to such
express warranties, notwithstanding the fact that such repairs are made
after the expiration of such term or such one-year period.
(c) If the manufacturer, or its agents or authorized dealers are un-
able to conform the motor vehicle to any applicable express warranty
by repairing or correcting any defect or condition which substantially
impairs the use and value of the motor vehicle to the consumer after a
reasonable number of attempts, the manufacturer shall replace the mo-
tor vehicle with a new motor vehicle or accept return of the vehicle
from the consumer and refund to the consumer the full purchase price
including all collateral charges, less a reasonable allowance for the con-
sumer's use of the vehicle. Refunds shall be made to the consumer,
and lienholder if any, as their interests may appear. A reasonable al-
lowance for use shall be that amount directly attributable to use by the
consumer prior to his first report of the nonconformity to the manufac-
turer, agent or dealer and during any subsequent period when the vehi-
cle is not out of service by reason of repair. It shall be an affirmative
defense to any claim under this act (1) that an alleged nonconformity
does not substantially impair such use and value or (2) that a noncon-
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formity is the result of abuse, neglect or unauthorized modifications or
alterations of a motor vehicle by a consumer.
(d) It shall be presumed that a reasonable number of attempts have
been undertaken to conform a motor vehicle to the applicable express
warranties, if (1) the same nonconformity has been subject to repair
four or more times by the manufacturer or its agents or authorized
dealers within the express warranty term or during the period of one
year following the date of original delivery of the motor vehicle to a
consumer whichever is the earlier date, but such nonconformity contin-
ues to exist or (2) the vehicle is out of service by reason of repair for a
cumulative total of thirty or more calendar days during such term or
during such period, whichever is the earlier date. The term of an ex-
press warranty, such one-year period and such thirty-day period shall
be extended by any period of time during which repair services are not
available to the consumer because of a war, invasion, strike or fire,
flood or other natural disaster.
(e) Nothing in this act shall in any way limit the rights or remedies
which are otherwise available to a consumer under any other law.
(f) If a manufacturer has established an informal dispute settlement
procedure which complies in all respects with the provisions of title 16
Code of Federal Regulations Part 703, as from time to time amended,
the provisions of subsection (c) of this section concerning refunds or
replacement shall not apply to any consumer who has not first resorted
to such procedure.
(2) In any action by the consumer against the manufacturer of a
motor vehicle, or the manufacturer's agent or authorized dealer, based
upon the alleged breach of an express or implied warranty made in
connection with the sale of such motor vehicle, the court, in its discre-
tion, may award to the plaintiff his costs and reasonable attorneys' fees
or, if the court determines that the action was brought without any sub-











Texas X X X X x e I
Washington X X X X X X X
Wisconsin X X X X X X
Wyoming X X X X X X X
As this Note went to press the text of lemon laws enacted by the legislatures of Colorado,
Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, Pennsylvania, and South Dakota remained unpublished. Citations to
bill numbers available Nov. 22, 1983, Electronic Legislature Search Service (CCH).
















Delaware X X_ X X X XX
Florida X X X X X X X
Maine X X X X X -X X
Massachusetts X X X X X
Minnesota X X X X X X X
Montana XX X X X X X
Nebraska X XX X X X X
Nevada -X rX X X X X
New Hampshire X X XX X X X
New Jersey X X XXX X X
New York X X X X X X
Oregon X X -IX X X X X
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